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MARKET SHARE LIABILITY IN DES CASES: THE
UNWARRANTED EROSION OF CAUSATION IN FACT
David M. Schultz*
INTRODUCTION
As our society progresses in complexity, theories of tort law have evolved in
order to provide redress for the harms caused in a changing world.' Tort law
evolution has resulted in the creation of new remedies and, in many instances,
the erosion of certain preconditions for recovery in tort.' Nevertheless, with
limited exceptions, there has not been significant erosion of the requirement
that a plaintiff must first be able to identify the person or entity that caused
her injury before she can recover in tort.3 In the past decade, however, a small
number of courts have abrogated this principle, which is referred to as "causa-
tion in fact." In the place of causation of fact, these courts have adopted the
concept of "market share liability."
The market share liability theory has developed mainly through lawsuits
filed by women who claim to suffer injuries resulting from their mothers' in-
gestion of the drug Diethylstilbestrol ("DES") while pregnant. These plaintiffs
are commonly referred to as the "DES daughters."4 The time that passes be-
tween the maternal ingestion of DES and the diagnosis of the injuries is gener-
ally twenty or more years because the injuries do not manifest themselves until
sometime after the daughter has reached puberty.' A DES daughter is often
* David M. Schultz is an associate of Hinshaw & Culbertson in Chicago, Illinois.
1. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 144 (noting that courts cannot adhere rigidly to legal doctrine in the face of advances in
science and technology), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Keeton, Creative Continuity in the
Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463, 463 (1962) (stating that "[a]ny legal system, to remain
viable over a span of time, must have the flexibility to admit change"); Comment, Market Share
Liability for Defective Products: An Ill-Advised Remedy for the Problem of Identification, 76
Nw. U.L. REV. 300, 304-07 (1981) (recounting the historical development of products liability
law).
2. See Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden in DES Litigation: The Market Share
Liability Theory, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 609, 609-11 (1982) (recognizing the trend towards liberaliz-
ing the requirements for recovery in products liability actions).
3. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D, OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 263
(5th ed. 1984).
4. See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FOROHAM L. REV.
963, 965 (1978).
5. Children of the women who took the drug are now having their own daughters. Some of
these granddaughters of women who ingested DES have suffered injuries possibly as a result of
their grandmothers' ingestion of DES. The viability of the granddaughters' cause of action'was
tested in Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 155 A.D.2d 64, 553 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1990), where the appel-
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unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the drug her mother took for
two key reasons: the long passage of time and the fungible nature of DES.
Faced with the possibility of leaving these plaintiffs without a remedy as a
result of their inability to identify the manufacturer, some courts have instead
abolished the traditional requirement of establishing causation in fact. In place
of causation in fact, these courts have adopted a theory that imposes liability
upon any defendant who participated in the manufacturing or marketing of
DES in the relevant market. Under this "market share liability" theory, each
defendant is liable for the proportion of the judgment that its share of the
market represented during the relevant time period.
Market share liability has been controversial since its inception. The concept
has been adopted with varying modifications by a handful of courtse and pro-
moted by a larger number of legal commentators.7 At the same time, other
courts have denounced the theory of market share liability when faced with
the opportunity to adopt the proposition in either DES cases or cases involving
other products.8 Currently, only nine state supreme courts have addressed the
late court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to proceed on a strict products liabil-
ity theory. See also Marcotte, DES Legacy, A.B.A. J., June 1990, at 14 (examining the viability of
suits by third generation DES plaintiffs); New DES Front, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1990, at I (report-
ing the first case claiming that DES genetically altered the grandchild of a woman who took the
drug).
6. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990); Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350
(1989); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Collins v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
7. E.g., Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L.
REV. 713 (1982) (advocating application of the market share liability theory to all multiple causa-
tion cases); Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method of Recovery for DES Litigants, 30
CATH. U.L. REV. 551 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method] (con-
cluding that the theory of market share liability is well founded, consistent with prior doctrine,
and a necessary expansion of tort liability); Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES
Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Market Share Liability: An
Answer] (suggesting that adoption of the market share liability theory is necessary to meet the
changing needs of consumers in today's complex society); Note, The DES Causation Conundrum:
A Functional Analysis, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 939 (1987) [hereinafter Note, The DES Causa-
tion Conundrum] (proposing that thZ market share liability theory is the only approach that can
effectively reconcile the conflicting interests of plaintiffs and defendants in DES litigation); Note,
The DES Manufacturer Identification Problem: A Florida Public Policy Approach, 40 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 857 (1986) [hereinafter Note, The DES Manufacturer Identification Problem] (contend-
ing that relaxing the identification requirement is consistent with judicial policies).
8. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984).
Legal commentators have also criticized the market share concept. See Kroll, Intra-Industry
Joint Liability: The Era of Absolute Products Liability, 687 INs. L.J. 185 (1980); Miller & Han-
cock, Perspectives on Market Share Liability: Time for a Reassessment?, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 81
(1985) (indicating that objections to the market share liability theory may be somewhat over-
stated, but believing that many practical problems remain with the theory); Recent Decisions,
Torts-Products Liability-Where a Plaintiff Cannot Identify Which Drug Company Manufac-
tured the DES Ingested, a Cause of Action Exists Under the Market Share Alternate Theory of
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market share liability issue in a DES case. Most likely, however, other juris-
dictions will eventually be forced to face this issue, especially in light of the
fact that DES was used nationwide, some plaintiffs have achieved success with
the theory, and there is the potential for large recoveries.
Most legal commentary on the issue of market share liability has supported
the adoption of the theory.' Commentators and courts that support the market
share liability theory correctly argue that there is a need to adapt our existing
tort law in the face of progress. They also argue that there is strong emotional
appeal to insure a remedy for all plaintiffs, especially plaintiffs who are inno-
cent of any wrongdoing. However, this Article contends that courts should not
develop a market share liability concept.
This Article begins with a brief history of the development of the drug DES.
In the next section, this Article reviews the tort requirement of causation in
fact. 10 The third section outlines the DES cases in which state supreme courts
have adopted market share liability, and the fourth section addresses cases
where courts have rejected the theory in the DES context and in other actions.
The Article concludes that market share liability is an unsound concept,
that it represents too wide a leap in our tort principles, and that the abrogation
of such a fundamental tort requirement is unwarranted. Two ideas are
presented to support this conclusion. First, there is insufficient data to accu-
rately develop the required market shares for each of the hundreds of pharma-
ceutical companies that produced DES. This lack of data precludes the fair
allocation of liability for DES related injuries among all DES manufacturers.
Second, upon close scrutiny, the underlying policies offered to justify adoption
of the market share liability theory are either not achieved by the theory, and
even if they can be achieved, they do not provide sufficient reasons to adopt it.
This Article proposes that the judicial development of market share liability
involves making public policy determinations that more appropriately should
be left for state legislatures. A legislative response, similar to the federal legis-
lation established to compensate persons injured by childhood vaccines such as
the diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus ("DPT") vaccine is a proper method of
compensation, and one that will not require a radical change in a state's tort
law.
Liability, 55 Miss. L.J. 195 (1985) [hereinafter Recent Decisions, Torts-Products Liability]
(claiming that adherence to a market share liability theory will deter market productivity and
scientific research); Comment, supra note 1, at 300 (concluding that the market share liability
theory creates more injustice than it eliminates by completely divorcing liability from responsibil-
ity); Note, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legislative Alternatives, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv.
1003 (calling for more equitable and simpler legislative solutions).
9. See supra note 7.
10. There are two distinct aspects of causation in fact addressed in DES cases: first, whether
DES caused the plaintiff's injuries; and second, which defendant produced the DES that caused
the injury. This Article is generally confined to the second aspect of causation.
1991]
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I. HISTORY OF DES
DES" is a synthetic substance that duplicates the activity of estrogen, a
female hormone crucial to sexual development and fertility.' 2 In 1940, a num-
ber of pharmaceutical companies sought Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approval to market DES in up to five milligram doses to treat vagi-
nitis, engorgement of the breasts, excessive menstrual bleeding, and symptoms
of menopause." The FDA approved the use of DES for these purposes in
1941,"' and, in 1947, the FDA approved the use of DES as a miscarriage
preventative.' 5 In 1952, the FDA declared that DES was no longer a "new
11. The history of the development of DES and its marketing in this country is chronicled most
thoroughly in cases that address whether the conspiracy and concert of action theories apply in
DES cases. See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981) (stating that civil
conspiracy and concert of action theories are not provable); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Lyons v. Premo
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert.
denied, 82 N.J. 267, 412 A.2d 774 (1979); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689
P.2d 368 (1984); see also Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method, supra note 7, at 551
(chronicling the history of the drug from 1947 to the discovery, in 1971, that it might cause
cancer in women); Note, The DES Causation Conundrum, supra note 7, at 939 (tracing FDA
involvement in DES marketing from the requirement that seller submit a New Drug Application
in 1938 to the withdrawal of this requirement in 1947).
12. Professor E.C. Dodds and his associates first synthesized DES in England in 1937. Profes-
sor Dodds did not patent DES; instead he left the drug available for general production by phar-
maceutical companies. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 317, 343 N.W.2d 164, 166,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
13. See Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1009; Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 588, 689 P.2d at 373.
14. See Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1009-10. Standard FDA procedure for the approval of a new
drug requires an applicant to file a New Drug Application ("NDA"). 21 U.S.C. § 360 (1988).
The NDA includes clinical data establishing the safety of the drug, the drug's chemical composi-
tion, the methods of manufacture, the proposed uses of the drug, and proposed labeling. Id. §
360(b). Numerous drug manufacturers filed an NDA for DES. See Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1009-
10. In an effort to simplify the application process, the FDA requested that the drug companies
withdraw their NDAs and submit their data jointly in a Master File. Id. at 1009. Accordingly, a
working committee of four companies was formed, consisting of Eli Lilly, Squibb, Upjohn, and
Winthrop Chemical Company. This committee- collected all the data, prepared the master file, and
submitted it to the FDA. To simplify the approval process even more, the FDA requested that
each company agree to "permission clauses" that would permit other applicants to refer to the
data in the Master File. Id.
However, submission of the clinical studies alone did not constitute an application by any com-
pany for permission to market DES. After the submission of the investigational material, each
company then had to file its own NDA seeking permission to market DES. Prior to approval, the
FDA made independent contact with clinicians and researchers, reviewed medical literature, and,
on occasion, required additional information to rebut those concerns that had been expressed by a
small number of physicians at the time. Id. at 1010. It has been remarked that the quality and
quantity of the information the FDA received about DES was higher than anything it had re-
ceived to date. Id.; see also Note, The DES Causation Conundrum, supra note 7, at 948-50.
15. The first supplemental NDAs seeking FDA approval for DES as a miscarriage inhibitor
were filed separately from the original DES NDAs. The new NDAs sought approval for the use of
DES to treat menopause and other problems. The NDAs relied on clinical studies published in
medical journals which attested to the safety and effectiveness of DES for use as a miscarriage
inhibitor. See Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1010; see also Note, The DES Causation Conundrum, supra
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drug" within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,16 and
was therefore considered safe for general use.17 This status allowed DES man-
ufacturers to market the drug without submitting data to the FDA concerning
its safety and effectiveness for any desired use. 18
In 1971, two medical studies suggested that there was a statistically signifi-
cant association between the outbreak of clear cell adenocarcinoma, a form of
cancer, in young women and the maternal ingestion of DES during preg-
nancy.19 The mothers of the women stricken with clear cell adenocarcinoma
generally had used DES as a miscarriage preventative.20 Later that year, the
FDA banned the sale of DES for use by pregnant women.21 According to esti-
mates, by the time of the FDA ban, as many as 300 companies had produced
DES for sale. 22 Each company's product was essentially fungible, in that each
product contained the same chemical composition. However, DES was mar-
keted in a number of different colors, dosages, sizes, and shapes.28
DES is no longer used as a miscarriage preventative. The drug is, however,
still prescribed as an estrogen replacement for women with hormone deficien-
cies, for treatment of unusual menopausal symptoms, and for treatment of
certain kinds of cancer of the breast and prostate. DES is also a major ingredi-
ent in the "morning-after pill," a post coital contraceptive.2"
Since the 1970s, hundreds of daughters of women who took DES while
note 7, at 949 n.58 (citing clinical studies such as Kaniaky, The Use of Stilbestrol for the Treat-
ment of Threatened and Habitual Abortion and Premature Labor: A Preliminary Report, 35 S.
MED. J. 838 (1942) and Smith, Diethylstilbestrol in the Prevention and Treatment of Complica-
tions of Pregnancy, 56 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 821 (1948)).
Between 1947 and 1952, approximately 85 companies manufactured DES. By the end of 1952,
up to 191 companies were manufacturing and distributing DES. Note, Market Share Liability: A
New Method, supra note 7, at 554-55.
16. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp: 1004, 1011 (D.S.C. 1981).
17. See Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 589, 689 P.2d 368, 374 (1984).
18. See id.; see also Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method, supra note 7, at 555
(citing FDA New Drug Application provisions).
19. Greenwald, Barlow, Nasca & Burnett,. Vaginal Cancer After Maternal Treatment with
Synthetic Estrogens, 285 NEw ENG. J. MED. 390 (1971) (reporting that there can no longer be
any doubt that adenocarcinoma is associated with DES therapy of the mother during pregnancy);
Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 NEw ENG. J. MED. 878
(1971).
20. See Comment, supra note 4, at 964-65 (indicating that estimates of the incidence of adeno-
carcinoma in DES daughters range from I in 250 to I in 1000).
21. Id. at 966 (noting that the FDA banned DES because of the danger it presented and be-
cause it was ineffective).
22. See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 231, 560 N.E.2d 324, 328 (1990)
(estimating that as many as 300 companies had at one time produced DES for sale); Martin v.
Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 589., 689 P.2d 368, 374 (1984) (stating that estimates of
companies that manufactured and marketed DES range from 200 to 300).
23. DES was marketed in round or oval shapes, in tablet and pill form. See generally Ryan v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (D.S.C. 1981) (noting that manufacturers marketed
DES in different dosages at different times for different prices using different marketing methods).
24. Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 170 N.J. Super. 183, 191-92, 406 A.2d 185,
189 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 82 N.J. 267, 406 A.2d 774 (1979).
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pregnant have filed lawsuits against DES manufacturers.2 Generally, the
complaints allege that the drug companies failed to test DES properly and to
warn women adequately of its dangers.2" The injuries these women suffered
are unquestionably serious. Some women have died, and others have required
partial or total hysterectomies due to cancer that may be linked to their
mother's ingestion of the drug.27 DES manufacturers, however, contend that
statistics regarding DES daughters have not shown a high incidence of cancer,
and that it is not generally accepted that the injuries suffered are the conse-
quence of the maternal ingestion of DES.2
8
25. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 181, 342 N.W.2d 37, 45 (estimating
that as many as 1000 class action or individual suits were pending against DES manufacturers in
1971), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); Rheingold, The Hymowitz Decision-Practical Aspects
of New York DES Litigation, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 883, 896 n.44 (1989) (estimating that there
have been about 3,000 DES cases filed nationally).
26. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144 (plaintiff attempted to proceed on the theories of negligence, concert of action,
strict liability, violation of express and implied warranties, false and fraudulent representations,
misbranding, conspiracy, and lack of consent), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Martin, 102
Wash. 2d at 581, 689 P.2d at 368 (plaintiff attempted to proceed on the theories of alternative
liability, concert of action, enterprise liability, and market share liability); Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at
166, 342 N.W.2d at 37 (plaintiff attempted to proceed on the theories of negligence, strict liabil-
ity, concert of action, and market share liability).
27. See Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 25-26, 427 A.2d 1121, 1124'
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (total abdominal hysterectomy), rev'd, 116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511
(1989); Lyons, 170 N.J. Super. at 189, 406 A.2d at 188 (after surgery, woman died of widespread
metastasis of clear cell adenocarcinoma and bronchopneumonia); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55
N.Y.2d 571, 577, 436 N.E.2d 182, 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 778 (1982) (all of plaintiff's internal
reproductive organs and more than half of her vagina were removed); Martin v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 583, 689 P.2d 368, 371 (1984) (radical hysterectomy, pelvic node dissec-
tion, and partial vaginectomy); Collins. 116 Wis. 2d at 174, 342 N.W.2d at 41 (removal of uterus,
part of vagina and several lymph nodes); see also Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 155 A.D.2d 64, 553
N.Y.S.2d 494 (1990) (child of woman who took DES suffered a malformed uterus, cervical and
uterine dysfunction, and squamous metaplasia).
28. There is contradictory evidence regarding the effects of exposure to DES. The National
Institute of Health and the National Cancer Institute sponsor a project known as the DESAD
Project. The Project has followed 1580 women born after 1940. In its January 1989 DES Update,
it reported that the "risk of cancer in a DES-exposed woman remains low." DESAD PROJECT,
DES UPDATE, Jan. 1989, at 1. "Although a few cancers of various types have been reported, they
are not more than the nimber that would be expected on the basis of chance alone and are not
more than those reported by unexposed women in the project." Id.; see also Fischer, Products
Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1981). The author
noted:
A worldwide registry of women suffering from adenocarcinoma indicates that only
384 of the women who have contracted the disease were born between 1940 and 1971.
Moreover, only 213 of these cases were associated with the use of DES. All 213 cases
may not have been caused by DES, however, because the evidence suggesting a causal
connection between the use of DES by pregnant women and the subsequent develop-
ment of adenocarcinoma in their offspring is not definitive. New cases almost cer-
tainly will develop in the future, but probably at a diminished rate, since the number
of new cases peaked in the middle 1970s. Of course, a second peak conceivably could
develop in the future, but available information does not indicate that this will
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Some DES plaintiffs who could identify the manufacturer of the DES their
mothers ingested have been able to proceed to trial.29 Other DES plaintiffs
allege, after extensive discovery, that they are unable to satisfy the identifica-
tion element.80 A number of circumstances contribute to the barrier of estab-
lishing causation in fact in these cases. The effect of prenatal exposure to DES
usually does not manifest itself until at least after the child reaches puberty,
and more years may pass before the cancer is linked to DES. During this long
interval, whatever records the doctor, pharmacy, or manufacturer maintained
often become lost or destroyed, and the memories of the persons involved have
faded. Contributing to the lack of records is the fact that the manufacturers
were not required by law to maintain records for long periods of time. 1 More-
happen.
Id. at 1624; see also Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 620-21, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150
(Richardson, J., dissenting) (noting that the incidence of cancer is estimated at one-tenth of one
percent to four-tenths of one percent); Herbst, Anderson, Hubby, Haenszel, Kaufman & Nollen,
Risk Factors for the Development of Diethylstilbestrol-Associated Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma:
A Case-Control Study, 154 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 814, 819-22 (1986) (examining
factors such as the date of DES ingestion, duration of exposure, total dosage of exposure, and
ingestion of other drugs, and how these factors relate to the risk of developing clear cell adenocar-
cinoma); Herbst, Cole, Norusis, Welch & Scully, Epidemiologic Aspects and Factors Related to
Survival in 384 Registry Cases of Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina and Cervix, 135 AM.
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 876, 876-77 (1979) (estimating that the correlation between the
use of DES and adenocarcinoma ranges from .14 to 1.4 per 1000 daughters exposed to the drug).
But see Melnick, Rates and Risks of Diethylstilbestrol-Related Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina
and Cervix, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 514 (1984) (the occurrence of clear cell adenocarcinoma
corresponds closely with the use of DES during pregnancy); Note, Market Share Liability: An
Answer, supra note 7, at 669 n.8 (referring to testimony at congressional hearings linking DES
ingestion to cancerous and precancerous vaginal tract abnormalities in prenatal exposed daughters
of DES users); Comment, supra note 2, at 612-13 (estimating that 20% of DES daughters exhibit
structural abnormalities).
Whether or not there is a correlation between DES ingestion and the type of cancer afflicting a
plaintiff sufficient to establish a cause of action in tort is a proper issue for a finder of fact. This
Article, however, concentrates on the legal issue of whether courts should adopt the concept of
market share liability.
29. A number of juries have found the drug company defendants in DES cases not liable for
the injuries suffered by DES daughters. See Joint Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 54 n.9,
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990) (67732 & 67747) (citing
Shirkey v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 84-C-288 (E.D. Wis. 1987); McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co., No 77-
C-4174 (N.D. II1. 1986); Becker v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 83-C-5163 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Mink v.
Eli Lilly & Co., No. 77-C-1432 (N.D. 11. 1983); Keil v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 570997 (E.D. Mich.
1980); Hadden v. Eli Lilly & Co., 208 N.J. Super. 716, 506 A.2d 844 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986)); see also Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185
(Super. Ct. App. Div.) (plaintiff able to identify manufacturer, but the drug brokerage firm held
not liable), cert. denied, 82 N.J. 267, 406 A.2d 774 (1979). But see, e.g., Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at
571, 436 N.E.2d at 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 776 ($500,000 verdict for plaintiff); Note, Market
Share Liability: An Answer, supra note 7, at 674 n.37 (citing Needham v. White Laboratories,
No. 76-1101 (N.D. Il1. 1979) ($800,000 verdict for plaintiff)).
30. See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (D.S.C. 1981) (stating that
plaintiff's major problem was her inability to identify the manufacturer of the DES her mother
had taken 28 years before even after over three years of discovery).
31. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 321, 343 N.W.2d 164, 168 (citing MICH.
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over, during the twenty-five years that DES was used to treat pregnancy-re-
lated problems, as many as 300 companies manufactured the fungible prod-
uct.82 Additionally, many manufacturers no longer exist, having either merged
with other concerns, or having gone bankrupt."3
II. THE IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
Typically, the tort causes of action DES daughters advance are based on
negligence or strict liability theories. A fundamental principle of these theo-
ries, and of tort law in general, holds that the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the named defendant caused the
harm or injury complained of; mere conjecture or speculation as to the identity
of the responsible party is insufficient proof of causation . 4 This principle is
known as the identification requirement. The requirement is one aspect of the
element of causation in fact, which in turn is a common element to virtually
all tort law litigation. The issue of identification, although important and pre-
sent in every negligence and strict liability action, is infrequently litigated.
Normally, plaintiffs know the identity of the manufacturer or seller of a prod-
uct, or the identity is not difficult to discover.3 5 This is not true, however, in
COMP. LAWS § 338.1118(1) (1976), which requires the preservation of prescription records for
only five years, repealed by 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 368 (current version at MICH. COMP. LAWS §
333.17752 (1980))), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
32. See supra note 22. DES is considered to be fungible because it was sold as a generic prod-
uct without regard to who manufactured it. See Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d
581, 589, 689 P.2d 368, 374 (1984) (noting that pharmacists filled prescriptions with whatever
company's drug was available because all were chemically identical).
33. See Comment, supra note 2, at 622 n.72.
34. See Annotation, Product Liability: Necessity and Sufficiency of Identification of Defend-
ants as Manufacturers or Seller of Product Alleged to Have Caused injury, 51 A.L.R.3D 1344,
1349 (1973) ("It is obvious that to hold a producer, manufacturer, or seller liable for injury
caused by a particular product, there must first be proof that the defendant produced, manufac-
tured, sold, or was in some way responsible for the product."); 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability
§ 163 (1984) ("If recovery is sought from a manufacturer, it must be shown that he actually was
the manufacturer of the product which caused the injury; if recovery is sought from a seller, it
must be shown that he actually sold the product in question.").
In a negligence action, proof of the causation in fact entails a reasonable connection between
the act or omission of the defendant and the damages which the plaintiff has suffered. See W.
KEETON, D. DOBBs, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 3, § 41, at 263, 269; see also Ney v.
Yellow Cab Co., 2 I11. 2d 74, 79, 119 N.E.2d 74, 76 (1954) (although violation of a statute is
primafacie evidence of negligence, the injury must still be rationally related to the negligence). In
a strict liability action, the one who sells a defective product that is unreasonably dangerous to the
user is liable for the resulting injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). To
recover under strict liability, the plaintiff must also establish some causal relationship between the
defendant and the injury-producing agent. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN
supra note 3, § 103, at 712-13. According to Professor Keeton, in order to recover in a strict
liability action, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that "claimant's injury or illness was attrib-
utable to a dangerous condition of a product identified as being one that was supplied by the
target defendant, either as a manufacturer or some other seller or supplier in the marketing
chain." Id.
35. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 164 (1984).
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market share cases. Therefore, an essential issue each court must address
when faced with a request to adopt market share liability is whether it is ad-
visable to abolish the identification requirement.
The identification element of causation in fact serves important functions in
the law of torts. One goal of our tort law is to compensate victims for their
injuries.3 6 However, our justice system has so far determined that a no-fault
society, one in which all injuries are compensable, is not desirable. Instead,
tort law only redresses those injuries that result from a defendant's culpability
and then only if the defendant can be identified. 7
In promoting the goal of compensating victims, however, it is necessary to
avoid establishing laws that act as an excessive deterrent to useful activity,
such as the production of socially desirable products.8 8 Therefore, tort law's
goal of compensation must be balanced against a second tort law interest, that
of protecting people from excessive liability. Requiring the plaintiff first to
identify the responsible defendant as a condition of liability insures that a de-
fendant will only be held liable for those injuries he more than likely caused.39
Because causation in fact limits a defendant's potential liability to injuries that
the defendant actually caused, the goal of preventing excessive deterrence is
promoted. Otherwise, if potential liability is excessive, a person's useful con-
duct along with his undesirable conduct will be inhibited.40 Moreover, al-
though causation in fact restricts liability, it also helps to assign blameworthi-
ness to the culpable party.41
Notwithstanding the benefits that causation in fact provides, a narrow line
of cases have created exceptions to the requirement of proof of causation in
fact. The particular exceptions that DES plaintiffs most often raise are enter-
prise liability42 and alternative liability.' These two exceptions allow a plain-
36. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 3, § 4, at 20 (noting that if
tort law did not otherwise compensate victims, a court would leave a loss where it falls); Fischer,
supra note 28, at 1629 (noting that the law seeks to compensate victims for their loss and to
discourage socially undesirable behavior).
37. A substantial factor test is often employed to evaluate the causation element of negligence.
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 3,. § 41, at 267-68. The substantial
factor test determines that the "defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about." Id. Obviously, the test cannot be evaluated
if the defendant cannot be identified.
38. See Fischer, supra note 28, at 1629 (noting that some activities are useful and should not
be discouraged although they may be considered potentially dangerous).
39. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 3, § 41, at 268.
40. Cf Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 158, 561 A.2d 511, 512 (1989) (reason-
ing that imposition of market share liability would threaten the continued availability of much
needed drugs).
41. Id. at 162-63, 561 A.2d at 515; see also Fischer, supra note 28, at 1629-30 (noting that in
order for tort law to resolve disputes among individuals, it must reflect popular notions of moral
responsibility, and people often associate moral blame and responsibility with causation in fact).
42. The elements necessary to prove an action based on enterprise liability include the
following:
(1) the injury-causing product was manufactured by one of a small number of defend-
ants in an industry; (2) the defendants had joint knowledge of the risks inherent in
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tiff to shift the burden of proof on the causation issue to a defendant or a
group of defendants. Liability may attach to the group of defendants as a
whole if a particular defendant is not identified as the party responsible for the
injury.4 ' Besides market share liability, DES daughters have pursued two
other causes of action with more lenient identification burdens: concert of ac-
tion 4 and civil conspiracy. 6 These two causes of action are not exactly excep-
the product and possessed a joint capacity to reduce those risks; and (3) each of them
failed to take steps to reduce the risk but, rather, delegated this responsibility to a
trade association.
Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super. 264, 285, 505 A.2d 973, 984 (1985); see also
Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that joint
liability among manufacturers of blasting caps could be found if plaintiffs show manufacturers
have joint knowledge of risks and joint ability to reduce risk).
This theory has not been successful in DES cases because the DES industry did not contain a
small number of manufacturers. There were literally hundreds of companies involved. Moreover,
DES manufacturers did not delegate control or responsibility for safety functions to a trade asso-
ciation. Instead, the FDA exercised pervasive regulation and control from the first stages of the
drug's manufacture. See Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Mo. 1984); see also
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 609-10, 607 P.2d 924, 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
143 (noting that standards DES manufacturers follow are suggested or compelled by the govern-
ment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
43. Alternative liability applies to situations when two or more defendants act tortiously toward
a plaintiff who, through no fault of her own, cannot identify which one of the defendants caused
the injury. In such a case, the burden of proof shifts to each defendant to prove his innocence or
be held jointly and severally liable with all other defendants. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433B(3), at 441-42 (1965); see also Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)
(holding both defendants liable where plaintiff was injured when two hunters negligently shot in
his direction and plaintiff could not ascertain which hunter's bullet injured him). Courts have
analogized to this theory when adopting market share liability, however, alternative liability has
not been accepted in its standard form. Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 244; see also Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at
602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (holding that plaintiffs are not required to estab-
lish that the defendants are in a better position to identify the actual tortfeasor). Courts have
explained that, in the DES cases, it is not definite that the negligent party is before the court, and
the defendants are not in a better position to determine who was the negligent party. Both of these
requirements are prerequisites for invoking alternative liability. See Martin v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 591-95, 689 P.2d 368, 375-77 (1984) (strict application of alternative
liability does not provide DES plaintiffs with a cause of action); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116
Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
Another theory that relieves the plaintiff of the burden of satisfying the causation in fact ele-
ment is res ipsa loquitur. Plaintiffs do not allege that this concept is applicable in the DES cases,
although they do analogize to it as a basis for adoption of market share liability. For a thorough
discussion of alternative liability and why it is not appropriate in DES cases, including a discus-
sion of the res ipsa loquitur analogy, see infra note 219.
44. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In
Hall, the plaintiffs were unable to identify the manufacturer of a blasting cap that injured a child.
Id. at 359. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint brought under a
enterprise liability cause of action because the court believed the plaintiffs could prevail. Id. at
376-78.
45. Concert of action exists when a tortious act is done in concert with another person pursuant
to a common design, or a party gives substantial assistance to another knowing that the other's
conduct constitutes a breach of duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a)-(b), at 315
(1979). With the concert of action theory, it is unnecessary for the parties to agree expressly to
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tions to the identification requirement. Although DES plaintiffs typically al-
lege elements of each of these causes of action, the courts almost always reject
all but the market share liability theory.'
There has been a split among courts on the question of whether to adopt
market share liability in negligence and strict liability actions brought against
drug manufacturers for injuries suffered by women whose mothers ingested
DES while pregnant. Currently, the highest courts of California,'48 Washing-
ton, 9 Wisconsin," New York,51 and, most recently, Florida5" have adopted
commit the tortious acts. The parties, however, are liable only if there is a tacit understanding
between them. W. PROSSER. TORTS § 46, at 292 (4th ed. 1971). In order to support a concert of
action claim, DES plaintiffs must allege that the defendants failed to test DES or to provide
sufficient warning of its dangers and that the defendants adequately relied upon tests performed
by one another and upon each others' promotional and marketing strategies. Id. However, the
majority of courts have found that there never was a tacit agreement between the companies
regarding marketing or testing of the drugs. Though they may have engaged in a significant
amount of parallel activity in producing and marketing DES for pregnancy uses, courts agree that
the activity did not rise to the level of concerted action. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 604-05, 607
P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41; Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 245 (holding that the level of agree-
ment or cooperation between defendants was insufficient to establish the "concert of action");
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982) (because
DES manufacturer made no motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action,
concerted action theory became controlling law of case), overruled by Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 508, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 948, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
350 (1989); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 599, 689 P.2d 368, 379 (1984)
(finding that a substantial amount of parallel activity in the industry is not unusual and that such
activity does not rise to the level of concert of action); see also Comment, supra note 2, at 615-18
(noting that the concert of action theory has never been applied outside of DES cases to avoid the
identification requirement). But see Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164
(recognizing concert of action), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
46. A civil conspiracy involves two or more persons who combine for the purpose of accomplish-
ing by concerted action either (I) a lawful purpose by unlawful means, or (2) an unlawful purpose
by lawful means. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 235, 560 N.E.2d 324, 329 (1990).
Again, the courts generally hold that though there was parallel activity, the DES manufacturers
did not act jointly in regard to gaining FDA approval to use DES for treatment of problem
pregnancies. See Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 188, 342 N.W.2d at 48; see also Burnside 351 Pa.
Super. at 280, 505 A.2d at 984 (holding that allegations of parallel and imitative conduct are
insufficient to establish a cause of action).
47. See supra notes 42-46.
48. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The market share liability theory, as specifically developed in
Sindell, has been adopted by only one federal district court. See McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
564 F. Supp. 265, 270-71 (D.S.D 1983) (applying what the court thought would be South Dakota
law). Notably, the California Supreme Court has since limited the application of market share
liability to cases premised on negligence only. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d
470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
49. Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984). The market share
liability theory, as adopted in Martin, was followed in McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F.
Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Mass. 1985). The Martin court adopted the market share liability theory,
finding that those injured by DES required some justice. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 603, 689 P.2d
at 382. The Martin court cited Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171
(1982), as an example of a court that would adopt market share liability under certain circum-
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some form of the market share liability theory in DES daughter cases. The
supreme courts of Illinois,53 Missouri, 4 and Iowa55 have specifically rejected
the market share liability theory in DES cases.
III. JUDICIALLY PROMULGATED MARKET SHARE THEORIES
None of the five states that have adopted the market share liability concept
have implemented the same procedure. All five states, however, have a number
of similarities in the procedures adopted. This section generally discusses the
concept of market share liability as a unified principle, noting the important
variations each state has included in the particular form adopted.
A. Reasons for Adopting a Market Share Liability Theory
The DES cases are examples of the reality that in our complex industrial-
ized society, advances in science and technology have created fungible goods
that may harm consumers and that are difficult to trace to a specific pro-
ducer.6 Courts faced with cases involving fungible products must determine
stances. Id. In Payton, the question certified from a federal district court was whether Massachu-
setts would recognize market share liability. Payton, 386 Mass. at 541-42, 437 N.E.2d at 173.
The Payton court found that it could not answer the question in the form presented and pointed
out flaws in the plaintiff's proposal. The court did, however, imply that under other circumstances
it might adopt market share liability. Id. at 574, 437 N.E.2d at 190; see also George v. Parke-
Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 733 P.2d 507 (1987) (refining the Martin theory by altering the rele-
vant market from a local market to a national market).
50. Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826
(1984).
51. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
52. Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
The Conley decision is very recent, therefore, it is not discussed in this Article. In Conley. the
Florida Supreme Court adopted the Washington Supreme Court version of alternative market
share liability with a few modifications. Id. at 286. This Article's discussion of Washington's alter-
native market share liability as adopted in Martin v. Abbott Laboratories applies for the most
part to the theory adopted by the Florida Supreme Court.
Florida's market share liability theory differs from Washington's theory in two respects. First,
under the Florida theory, a plaintiff must make a showing that she made "a genuine attempt to
locate and identify the manufacturer responsible for her injury." Id. A second modification is that
the Florida theory is restricted to negligence causes of action. Id.
53. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 III. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990).
54. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984); see Note, DES Recovery in Mis-
souri: Confined by Traditional Tort Principles, 53 UMKC L. REv. 692 (1985) (discussing the
Zafft case).
55. Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986).
56. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144 (noting that two possible responses of the court to such advances are to adhere to
prior doctrine or to fashion remedies to meet the changing needs), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 507, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d
941, 947 (noting that traditional unmodified common law doctrine would provide no relief for
DES plaintiffs "who cannot identify the particular manufacturer of the DES ingested by their
mothers"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
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whether they will fashion a procedure to allow the plaintiff to overcome the
obstacles of identification that these technological advances cause. Courts in
the DES cases answering this question affirmatively generally rely on three
basic policy reasons as justification for adopting market share liability.
The first policy is that as between an innocent plaintiff and a manufacturer
of a defective product, the manufacturer should bear the cost of the injury. 57
The courts conclude that the plaintiff in these cases is not at fault in failing to
provide evidence of causation, reasoning that the conduct of the defendants
played a significant role in creating the unavailability of proof.56 The Wash-
ington and Wisconsin courts expanded on this justification, explaining that be-
cause each defendant contributed to the risk of injury to the public and conse-
quently to the risk of injury to the plaintiff, each defendant shared, in some
degree, culpability for producing or marketing DES."
Courts also articulate two other policy reasons to support the adoption of
market share liability. The second policy justification is that as between the
injured plaintiff and the possibly responsible drug company, the drug company
is in a better position to absorb the cost of the injury."0 The large pharmaceu-
tical companies, the courts conclude, not only can insure against the costs of
injury, they also can pass on these costs to the public.61 The final reason given
to support market share liability adoption is that because the manufacturer is
in the best position to recognize defects in its products and to guard against
them, holding the producer liable for these defects provides an incentive to
produce safe products.62
57. See Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 507, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947; Collins v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 191, 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (concluding that "interests of justice and
fundamental fairness" demand that manufacturers who may have provided the product that
caused the injury shoulder the cost of that injury), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
58. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
59. Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 604, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (1984); Collins,
116 Wis. 2d at 191, 342 N.W.2d.at 49. The Collins court also noted that it was compelled to
adopt a theory of recovery because of the substantive right to a remedy the state's constitution
established in its "certain remedy" provision. Id. at 182, 342 N.W.2d at 45 (quoting WIs. CONST.
art. 1, § 9).
60. See, e.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (noting that
the cost of an injury and the loss of time or health can be an overwhelming misfortune to the
injured person); Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 604, 689 P.2d at 382 (explaining that drug companies
and consumers should share the cost of the injury, rather than placing the burden solely on the
innocent plaintiff).
61. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 507, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941, 947 (concluding it would be inconsistent with the expectations of modern society to
place the burden of DES injuries on the victims), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989); Martin, 102
Wash. 2d 604, 689 P.2d at 382 (concluding that it is better to have the drug manufacturers and
the public share the burden of the loss, rather than putting it all on the innocent plaintiff).
62. See Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 191-92, 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (noting "the
cost of damages awards will act as an incentive for drug companies to test adequately the drugs
they place on the market for general medical use"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); see also
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144
(stating that the manufacturer is in the best position to prevent product defects, and holding
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B. Market Share Liability Theory
These three policy reasons have prompted courts to reevaluate their state's
tort laws in an attempt to hold DES manufacturers responsible for injuries
their drugs caused. The first court to adopt market share liability was the
California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.63 The Sindell
court based the market share liability theory it adopted, and some of its ra-
tionale in adopting the theory, on a student law review article.6' The article
argued that, in DES cases, some form of enterprise liability should be fash-
ioned."8 The court, however, did not literally follow the article's proposal. 66
Similarly, each court adopting market share liability since Sindell has likewise
placed its own twist on the market share liability theory.
The preliminary component of any case using market share liability con-
cerns the number of defendants who must be joined. In Sindell, the court held
that the plaintiff had to join as defendants the manufacturers of a substantial
percentage of the DES sold in the relevant market.67 This requirement must
be met before defendants may cross-claim against other possibly responsible
manufacturers liable for defects will provide an incentive to make safe products), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980).
63. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The
plaintiff in Sindell did not seek the adoption of market share liability. The Sindell court rejected
the three theories for recovery proposed by the plaintiff and sua sponte developed the market
share liability concept. Id. at 597-613, 607 P.2d at 928-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132-46. Two facts that
the court cited may have influenced it to adopt the theory. First, the court believed that injuries
resulting from the use of DES were widespread and that many DES daughters would be looking
to the courts for recovery but would be unable to identify the culpable party. Id. at 597, 607 P.2d
at 927-28, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135-36. Second, the plaintiff represented to the court that as few as
six companies produced 90% of the DES marketed. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
145. The Sindell court, therefore, may have believed that imposing liability on a small group of
manufacturers was not inequitable and that it was probable that the small group was likely re-
sponsible for plaintiff's injuries. The small group of manufacturers involved made it appear more
likely that the market shares for the group could be developed. However, it is unlikely that six
companies produced 90% of the DES marketed, and it does not appear that any other plaintiff or
court has ever cited this small estimate.
64. Comment, supra note 4, at 963.
65. See id. at 1003-06. The Comment suggested that industry-wide standards caused the plain-
tiff's injury. Id. at 997. The Comment proposed seven requirements for a cause of action based
upon industry-wide liability: (1) insufficient industry-wide standards as to the manufacture of a
product, (2) lack of proof as to the causative agent is due to defendant's conduct, (3) a generally
similar defective product was manufactured by all of the defendants, (4) the defective product
caused plaintiff's injury, (5) defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was a member
(6) clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff's injury was caused by a product made by one
of the defendants, and (7) all defendants were tortfeasors. Id. at 995.
The Comment suggested that if a plaintiff proves all seven elements, the burden of proof of
causation should shift to the defendants, who may exonerate themselves only by proving their
product could not have caused the injury. Id. at 999-1000.
66. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
67. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (emphasis added). The court defined
substantial share as less than 75-80% of the market share. Id.
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manufacturers. 68 The substantial share component was important in the con-
cept of the market share liability theory conceived in the law review comment
the court relied upon." The substantial share requirement diminishes the like-
lihood that a manufacturer will be liable for injuries a product it did not pro-
duce caused. 0 Therefore, the substantial share requirement helps preserve the
causation in fact element to a limited extent because a manufacturer who con-
tributed to a substantial share of a market for DES will more likely be liable
for injuries its products actually caused.7 1
On the other hand, the other four states, which have adopted market share
lability have not adopted the substantial share component of the California
theory. In Washington, Wisconsin, and New York, the plaintiff need only sue
one drug company that produced DES and that company's DES sales need not
constitute a substantial share of the market.7 2 Inevitably, though, a single
named defendant will implead other companies that sold DES in the relevant
market.7 3
The next element necessary to succeed in a market share liability action is
that the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case on every element of a negli-
gence or strict liability action except identification of the direct tortfeasor.7'
Therefore, the plaintiff must prove, by the preponderance of the evidence, that
her mother took DES, that the DES caused subsequent injuries, that the de-
fendant produced or marketed the type of DES the plaintiff's mother ingested,
and that the production and marketing of DES breached a legally recognized
duty to the plaintiff.
7 6
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 963, 996 (1978) which noted that a substantial market share of 75-80% mimics the plain-
tiff's clear and convincing evidence standard).
70. Comment, supra note 4, at 996 (reasoning that an alternative liability cause of action is
approached by naming manufacturers having a substantial share of the market).
71. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-12, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
72. See Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 605, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (1984)
(holding that requiring the joinder of a substantial share of the market does not alter the
probability of liability under a market share alternate liability theory; thus, the plaintiff need only
commence suit against one defendant); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 193, 342
N.W.2d 37, 50, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); cf Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d
487, 512-13, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1079, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989)
(noting that a DES defendant's liability can only be several, and not joint).
73. See, e.g., Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 606, 689 P.2d at 383 (recognizing that a single named
defendant may implead other drug manufacturers in order to establish its presumptive share or to
reduce its projected market share).
74. Id. at 604-05, 689 P.2d at 382.
75. See, e.g., Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 510-11, 539 N.E.2d at 1076-77, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948-
49; Martin, 102 Wash. at 604, 689 P.2d at 382; Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 193, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
The Collins court later stated in detail the prima facie requirements for each cause of action:
On a negligence theory, the plaintiff must prove that a defendant drug company had a
duty of care and breached that duty of care when it produced or marketed' Des
[sic]. .. .
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Once the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of negligence, the bur-
den shifts to the defendant to exculpate itself.7 6 In order to do so, a defendant
must prove by a preponderance of evidence that it did not produce or market
the type of DES the mother took, that it did not produce or market DES for
the prevention of miscarriage in that geographical area, or that it did not pro-
duce or market DES at that time.1
In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Company, 8 New York's highest court, the
Court of Appeals, made it difficult for a defendant to exculpate itself." New
York uses a national market. Therefore, a defendant can only exculpate itself
through proof that it did not participate in the marketing of DES for preg-
nancy use.80 Even conclusive proof that the defendant-manufacturer could not
have caused a particular plaintiff's injury is insufficient for exculpation pur-
poses in New York.81
If the defendant fails to exculpate itself, the court next defines the relevant
geographic market area for the purpose of measuring and apportioning liabil-
ity. Remaining defendants which provided DES in the relevant geographic
market become members of the plaintiff's DES market.8 The relevant geo-
graphic market area ideally is defined on a local level, however, where local
market share evidence is unavailable, county, state, or even national market
share figures are admissible to determine the defendant's market share.88
Damages are then apportioned according to the likelihood that any of the de-
fendants supplied the product.84 This apportionment is achieved by holding
[In a strict products liability action] the plaintiff must prove (I) that the DES was
defective when it left the possession or control of the drug company; (2) that it was
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; (3) that the defect was a cause of
the plaintiff's injuries or damages; (4) that the drug company engaged in the business
of producing or marketing DES or, put negatively, that this is not an isolated or
infrequent transaction not related to the principal business of the drug company; and
(5) that the product was one which the company expected to reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition it was sold.
Id. at 195-96, 342 N.W.2d at 51.
76. See, e.g., Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 605, 689 P.2d at 382.
77. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 195-96, 342 N.W.2d 37, 51, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); see also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607
P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
78. 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
79. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of New York's adoption of
a national market).
80. Hyrnowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
81. Id. Because liability is based on the overall risk created by each defendant, the court con-
sidered it "a windfall for a producer to escape liability solely because it manufactured a more
identifiable pill, or sold only to certain drugstores. These fortuities in no way diminish the culpa-
bility of a defendant for marketing the product, which is the basis of liability here." Id.
82. Id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
83. See George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 592, 733 P.2d 507, 512 (1987).
84. Punitive damages may not be assessed in an action using the market share theory under
which liability is based solely upon the manufacturer's participation in the market. See, e.g., Ma-
gallanes v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 3d 878, 889, 213 Cal. Rptr. 547, 554 (1985) (describ-
ing punitive damages in the market share scheme as "inherently unfair"); Collins v. Eli Lilly &
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each defendant liable for the proportion of the judgment its share of the mar-
ket represents.88 The intended result of market share liability is that a manu-
facturer's liability for an injury will be approximately equivalent to the
amount of damage caused by the DES the manufacturer supplied in the rele-
vant market area.86
New York is the only state which refuses to narrow the relevant market.
Rather, New York uses a national market.8 7 New York rejected the idea that
a market share liability theory could be finely tailored so that liability for
many injuries would equal the injuries actually caused by the product of a
particular manufacturer. 8 Nevertheless, the New York court realized that a
national market could not provide a reasonable link between liability and the
risk a defendant created toward a particular plaintiff.8 Instead, a national
market apportions "liability so as to correspond to the overall culpability of
each defendant, measured by the amount of risk of injury each defendant cre-
ated to the public-at-large."90
Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 202, 342 N.W.2d 37, 54 (denying a cause of action for punitive damages on
summary judgment), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
Punitive damages are imposed upon an identified defendant for its malicious acts which have
caused the plaintiffs injuries. Punitive damages are intended to punish and deter wrongdoers for
acting with malice, not just because they distributed their products in the marketplace. AMERICAN
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 9:36 (1989). But see Note, Sindell and Beyond: A Case for
Imposing Punitive Damages in Market Share Litigation, 17 PAC. L.J. 1445, 1466-70 (1986). The
Note argues that to allow only compensatory damages will not adequately deter the defendant
from future wrongdoing because liability insurance often covers most of a compensatory claim,
and the defendant will not feel the pain of having to pay the awards. The Note suggests that if a
plaintiff can prove an industry-wide conscious disregard for the public safety, then punitive dam-
ages may be apportioned under the market share liability theory. Id.
85. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 512-13, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078,
541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950 (holding the liability of'DES defendants is several based upon national
market share), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 581 Wash. 2d
581, 605-06, 689 P.2d 368, 383 (1989) (noting that defendants that prove market share shall pay
that percentage of the damages awarded to the plaintiff).
86. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); see also Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 605-07, 689 P.2d at 383
(noting that no defendant will be held liable for more harm than it statistically could have
caused); Fischer, supra note 28, at 1643-44 (calling for adoption of a broad, uniform definition of
the relevant market on the grounds that it is far more likely to result in fair apportionment of
damages.than using small or local markets). But see Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at
1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950 (realizing that liability will not, over the run of cases, approximate
causation).
87. Hymowitz. 73 N.Y.2d at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The court most
likely was influenced to adopt the national market concept because the attorneys for the parties
favored that market, and a California court had already worked out figures based on a national
market. Rheingold, supra note 25, at 893.
88. See Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 511-12, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
89. Id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
90. Id. Though it is too early to determine how Hymowitz will be received, it certainly is
unique in its departure from established tort principles. The decision is criticized as flawed in that
liability cannot be equated to actual harm caused. See Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J.
155, 197, 561 A.2d 511, 532 (1989) (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (recognizing Hymowitz as perhaps
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A last common characteristic of market share liability is that the liability is
not joint and several; rather, it is only several. 91 In adopting market share
liability, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that joint and several
liability would represent a retreat from the attempt to achieve as close an
approximation as possible between a defendant's liability for damages and its
individual responsibility for the injuries that the products it manufactured
caused.92 In cases in which all manufacturers in the market are not joined, a
plaintiff will receive less that 100% recovery because liability will be limited
to the market share represented. 93
Beyond this basic framework of market share liability, each state has devel-
oped certain important distinctions. The unique twists to the theory adopted
by California and New York courts have already been discussed.9 ' However,
Washington and Wisconsin also have developed profound variations in their
versions of market share liability. These variations generally relate to the ap-
portionment of damages.
The market share liability theory that the Washington court has adopted is
known as "alternative market share liability" because of its similarities to al-
ternative liability.90 Under the Washington theory, after defining the geo-
graphic market, all defendants are presumed to have equal market shares and
are liable on a pro rata basis.96 Manufacturers may rebut this presumption by
proving their actual market share.9" A defendant proving actual market share
in the relevant market is only liable for a percentage of damages equivalent to
the market share. 98 The presumptive share of the remaining defendants that
are unable to establish their actual market share is then adjusted upward, so
that 100% of the market is accounted for.99 If all defendants are able to es-
the most controversial of the market share decisions); Wilner & Bayer, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly:
New York Adopts a "National Risk" Doctrine'for DES, 25 TORT & INs. L.J. 150, 150 (1989)
(the court "abrogated hundreds of years of common law and the basic tort principle of causation
by holding that liability of DES manufacturers is based on the 'overall risk produced' to the
'public at large' and not on causation in a single case"). But see Twerski, Market Share-Tale of
Two Centuries, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 869, 870 (1989) (praising Hymowitz for not "paying
senseless obeisance to tradition").
91. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1074-75, 751 P.2d 470, 486-87, 245
Cal. Rptr. 412, 428 (1988).
92. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 512-13, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941, 950, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
93. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging that under several liability, some plaintiffs might not receive a
100% recovery).
94. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing the California theory); supra
notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing the New York theory).
95. See Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 602, 689 P.2d 368, 381 (1984).
96. Id. at 605, 689 P.2d at 383.
97. Id. at 605-06, 689 P.2d at 383.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 606, 689 P.2d at 383. In George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 586, 733 P.2d
507, 514 (1987), the Washington Supreme Court held that if a defendant impleads a third party
defendant who is not amenable to suit in an attempt to reduce its presumptive share, then the
impleading defendant has the burden of establishing the actual market share of the impleaded
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tablish their actual market share and the percentage of the market represented
is less than 100%, plaintiff's recovery is limited to the percentage of the mar-
ket that is actually represented.100
Wisconsin's theory, on the other hand is known as the "risk contribution
theory," and relies on that state's comparative negligence statute for appor-
tioning damages. 101 Under Wisconsin's theory, if only one company is sued
and no others are impleaded, that company is liable for all the damages if it
cannot exculpate itself.10 2 If more than one defendant is joined or impleaded,
then damages are determined according to the jury's assignment of liability
under Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute.103 A number of factors may
be considered in apportioning damages. These factors include the market
share of the defendant, whether the company conducted safety tests on DES,
the role the company played in seeking FDA approval of the drug, and
whether the company issued warnings about the dangers of DES.0 4
IV. COURTS THAT HAVE REJECTED MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
DES CASES
The concept of market share liability has not received strong support. The
supreme courts of Illinois,10 5 Missouri, 10° and Iowa"07 have refused outright to
adopt the market share liability theory in the context of DES daughter cases.
The extent of each court's analysis varies, although there are certain common
justifications that each court has given for its holding. Each court has recog-
nized the strong appeal of imposing liability on manufacturers that profited
defendant. Id.
100. Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 597, 689 P.2d 368, 383 (1984).
101. Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 199-200, 342 N.W.2d 37, 52-53, cert. denied,
469 U.S. 833 (1984); see also WIs. STAT. § 895.045 (1990) (proportioning damages among culpa-
ble defendants based upon the percentage of causal negligence attributable to each).
102. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 194, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
103. Id. at 199-200, 342 N.W.2d at 52-53; see also WIs. STAT. § 895.045 (1990).
104. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 200, 342 N.W.2d at 53. Specifically, the court concluded:
In assigning a percentage of liability to each defendant, the jury may consider factors
which include, but are not limited to, the following: whether the drug company con-
ducted tests on DES for safety and efficacy in use for pregnancies; to what degree the
company took a role in gaining FDA approval of DES for use in pregnancies; whether
the company had a small or large market share in the relevant area; whether the
company took the lead or merely followed the lead of others in producing or market-
ing DES; whether the company issued warnings about the danger of DES; whether
the company produced or marketed DES after it knew or should have known of the
possible hazards DES presented to the public; and whether the company took any
affirmative steps to reduce the risk of injury to the public.
Id.
105. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990).
106. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984); see also Note, supra note 54, at
692 (discussing the Zafft case).
107. Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986).
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from the sale of a product that has injured an innocent victim.108 However,
these courts have realized that the market share liability theory was too great
a deviation from existing tort law and, therefore, as the theory presently ex-
isted, was not a viable concept.109 The market share liability theory, as these
courts perceived it, did not present sufficient policy reasons to alter causation
in fact.' 10 Rather, if any change was to be made to the existing tort laws, the
courts reasoned that the legislature, and not the courts, would be better
equipped to construct a solution to the DES liability problem."'
In addition, the Illinois and Missouri courts stressed that the inadequacies
of the data available on manufacturers' market share made the concept un-
workable."' As a result, these two courts reasoned that it would be unfair to
award damages based on inaccurate evidence.1"' Both courts also declined to
embrace the underlying policy reasons on which the courts that accepted mar-
ket share liability relied."" In Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co.," 5 the Missouri Su-
108. E.g., Smith, 137 II1. 2d at 222, 560 N.E.2d at 324 (stating that "[i]t is tempting in this
case to impose liability based on the fact that these companies profited from the sale of the type of
drug which may be responsible for the plaintiff's injuries, regardless of the manufacturers' ability
to cover these costs"); Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d at 75-76 (acknowledging that a "plaintiff in a DES
case with an unidentified product manufacturer presents an appealing claim for relief"); Zafft,
676 S.W.2d at 246 (noting that the court "acknowledges and respects the compelling reasons
motivating the trial court and courts of other states to resolve the dilemma presented in these
cases by straining existing law or adopting novel theories").
109. The Iowa court recognized market share as a radical departure from traditional tort con-
cepts, refusing to allow "negligence in the air" to serve as a substitute for causation in fact.
Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d at 76 (quoting F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 455 (11 th ed. 1920)); see
also Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 246-47 (noting that there was insufficient justification to adopt a theory
that shifted the burden of causation to the defendant and substantially altered existing rights and
liabilities).
110. E.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 I11. 2d 222, 261-65, 560 N.E.2d 324, 341-43 (1990)
(considering and rejecting policy reasons the plaintiffs proposed for adopting the theory).
11l. In Mulcahy, the court equated the market share liability theory to a judicially developed
insurance plan that required manufacturers to pay for injuries their product may not have caused.
Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d at 76. The Mulcahy court concluded that "awarding damages to an admit-
ted innocent party by means of a court-constructed device that places liability on manufacturers
who were not proved to have caused the injury involves social engineering more appropriately
within the legislative domain." Id.; see also Smith, 137 II1. 2d at 262-63, 560 N.E.2d at 342
(noting that "[pierhaps ... this change is more appropriate for the legislature to develop, with its
added ability to hold hearings and determine public policy").
112. Smith, 137 I11. 2d at 253, 560 N.E.2d at 337-38 (finding that it would be an unwise
burden placed on the courts, both monetarily and in terms of workload, to require them to re-
create the market shares of the many manufacturers involved in the production and distribution of
DES); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Mo. 1984).
113. Smith, 137 III. 2d at 253, 560 N.E.2d at 338 (noting that "[i]f we were to allow courts
and juries to apportion damages when reliable information is not available, the clear result would
be that the determinations will be arbitrary and there will be wide variances between judgments,
without sufficient explanation as to these differences"); Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 246 (stating that
"market share liability continues the risk that the actual wrongdoer is not among the named
defendants, and exposes those joined to liability greater than their responsibility").
114. See Smith, 137 Ill. 2d at 260-68, 560 N.E.2d at 337-43 (discussing and rejecting policy
reasons relied upon by courts adopting the market share liability theory); Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at
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preme Court discounted the argument that "as between an innocent plaintiff
and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury" be-
cause "defendants can better absorb [the] cost" of injury. " 6 The Zafft court
stated that this argument 'ignored the strong countervailing interests that sup-
port the causation in fact requirement.117 The Illinois and Missouri courts also
both recognized that adoption of market share liability would have little effect
on production of safer products." 8 In fact, these courts believed adoption of
market share liability would have a detrimental effect on desired pharmaceuti-
cal research and development." 9 In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court dis-
puted whether the theory would have any significant effect on enhancing rec-
ord keeping. 20
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.,' further ex-
plained that the market share liability theory had the potential for treating
plaintiffs who were unable to identify the culpable manufacturer better than
the average plaintiff who was able to do so. Where the manufacturer can be
identified, a plaintiff runs the risk that the culpable party may not be amena-
ble to suit or may be insolvent.' The Smith court also refuted the plaintiff's
247 (concluding that policy justifications were not persuasive enough to veer from existing state
tort law requirements).
115. 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984).
116. Id. at 246. Likewise, the Smith court pointed out that, due to the increased insurance
costs, a number of drugs are no longer available to the public and that the federal government has
interceded to insure the availability of some drugs. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 261-
63, 560 N.E.2d 324, 341-42 (1990). However, the court refused to consider whether there was an
insurance crisis, or whether the manufacturers were in a position to insure against these losses and
should, therefore, bear the burden of the damages. Id. at 261, 560 N.E.2d at 341.
117. Id.
118. Smith, 137 I1. 2d at 261-63, 560 N.E.2d at 341-42; Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 247.
119. Smith, 137 I1. 2d at 261-62, 560 N.E.2d at 342; Zafft. 676 S.W.2d at 247.
120. See Smith, 137 I1. 2d at 264, 560 N.E.2d at 343.
121. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Il. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990).
122. Id. at 255, 560 N.E.2d at 338-39. The Smith court reasoned that the typical plaintiff in a
tort case takes the risk that the defendant will be unable to assume financial responsibility for
injuries caused. With market share liability, however, liability is spread among industry members,
reducing the risk that plaintiff will be without a solvent defendant. The theory, therefore, may
punish plaintiffs who satisfy the identification element, while creating an incentive not to locate
the particular manufacturer. Id., 560 N.E.2d at 339; see also Comment, supra note 2, at 632-33
(arguing that the market share liability theory exposes defendants to double liability, first to plain-
tiffs who can identify them as the causal party and again to plaintiffs who cannot).
One commentator argues that to avoid this unfairness, a plaintiff should have to prove that she
used due diligence in her attempt to identify the responsible manufacturer. Comment, The Appli-
cation of a Due Diligence Requirement to Market Share Theory in DES Litigation, 19 J.L. RE-
FORM 771, 782-83 (1986). A federal district court, however, rejected the due diligence require-
ment, reasoning that a plaintiff already has sufficient incentive to identify the responsible
manufacturer, as well as the unlikelihood that, if ascertainable, the identity of the culpable de-
fendant would not be disclosed. McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D.
Mass. 1985). The McCormack court reasoned that any information the plaintiff has relevant to
identity will be available to the defendants through discovery. Id. at 1527-28. Availability of iden-
tity evidence will frustrate a plaintiff who desires not to discover the culpable defendant. Id. at
1528. Second, the plaintiff has incentive to identify the defendant because she will be ensured full
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contention that the defendants' breach of a duty to her formed a basis for
adopting the theory.123 Moreover, the Smith court concluded that imposing
liability under the market share liability theory would make the remaining
manufacturers of DES the insurers of the industry. 2' The Illinois court rea-
soned that imposing liability would be especially unfair because the relevant
industry existed between twenty and forty years ago and there were some 300
manufacturers involved; however, only the few manufacturers still in existence
would have to shoulder the liability costs. 2 Lastly, the Smith court rejected
the plaintiff's analogies to res ipsa loquitur and alternative liability as too
tenuous. '2
Most federal courts that have addressed the issue of whether to apply mar-
ket share liability in a DES case have declined to adopt the theory.127 The
federal courts generally characterize the theory as a radical departure from
the common law of the state in which they sit.' 28 Therefore, without a clear
direction from a state's supreme court, a federal court sitting in diversity
would be usurping the proper authority of a state court. "
For example, in Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co.,' 30 the South Carolina federal
district court refused to apply California's market share lability law.' Even
though the Sindell rule was the appropriate law according to conflict of law
recovery at a much lower litigation cost. Id. Also, the plaintiff, through no fault of her own, may
have a difficult time establishing due diligence. The concept of due diligence itself is at odds with
market share liability, which presumes that the plaintiff cannot identify the manufacturer. Id. at
1528-29; see also Note, McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories: Application of Market Share Lia-
bility to Resolve the DES Dilemma, 29 ARz. L. REV. 155 (1987) (discussing McCormack).
123. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 II1. 2d 222, 265-67, 560 N.E.2d 324, 343-44 (1990); see
also Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986) (stating that proof of negli-
gence alone is insufficient to impose liability).
124. Smith, 137 Ill. 2d at 267-68, 560 N.E.2d at 344; see also Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d at 76
(characterizing market share liability as a court-constructed insurance plan).
125. Smith, 137 I11. 2d at 259-60, 560 N.E.2d at 341.
126. Id. at 257-58, 560 N.E.2d at 340. The Smith court noted that, unlike alternative liability
and res ipsa loquitur, there was a possibility that with market share liability, the defendant caus-
ing the injury may not be before the court. Id.
127. Federal courts typically gain jurisdiction over DES tort disputes in diversity actions where
the plaintiff is a resident of a state in which none of the named defendants i incorporated. See,
e.g., Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 591 (D.S.C. 1981). Contra McCormack v.
Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Mass. 1985) (adopting the market share liabil-
ity theory based on the court's interpretation of Massachusetts law).
128. See Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593, 599 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
129. See, e.g., id. (noting that the "market share theory unquestionably represents a radical
departure from the traditional concept of causation" and that there was no indication that Florida
would abandon such a fundamental principle); Pipon v. Burroughs-Wellcome Co., 532 F. Supp.
637, 639 (D.N.J. 1982) (noting that there was no indication that the New Jersey Supreme Court
would deviate from the causation requirement), aff'd, 696 F.2d 984 (3rd Cir. 1982); Ryan v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1019 (D.S.C. 1981) (noting that the South Carolina supreme
court has not made any exceptions to the rule that the plaintiff has the burden of proving
causation).
130. 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981).
131. Id. at 596-97.
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principles,132 the Mizell court refused to apply market share liability because
it violated the public policy of the forum state, South Carolina.'33 The Mizell
court concluded that "[m]arket share represents a radical departure from the
body of products liability law that has been developed in South Carolina" and
has the potential for placing liability on defendants who bear no responsibility
for the defective product. 34
Likewise, in Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co.,' 35 a case decided under Maryland
law, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declined to adopt the
market share liability theory.'36 The Tidier court reasoned "that the theory
that plaintiffs would have us 'construct' requires that we build on a new foun-
dation, not on the structural underpinnings of the traditional common law of
torts.' 3 7 Neither the highest court of Maryland nor the District of Columbia
had addressed the issue.138 The Tidier court, therefore, held that such a
marked deviation from the common law was beyond the authority of a federal
court bound by the Erie doctrine.' 39
B. Attempts to Expand Market Share Liability Beyond DES Cases
Plaintiffs have attempted to extend market share liability to contexts other
than DES cases but with considerably less success. In Shackil v. Lederle Lab-
oratories,40 the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to apply market share
liability in an action filed against manufacturers of the diphtheria, pertussis,
and tetanus ("DPT") vaccine.' 4' The plaintiff in Shackil allegedly became se-
verely retarded as a result of receiving a DPT vaccine. 4 2 The plaintiff was
132. In Mizell, the plaintiffs mother took DES in 1954 while a resident of California. Id. at
592. The court held California tort law applied since the injury, the plaintiffs in vitro exposure to
DES occurred in California. Id. at 594-95.
133. Id. at 596-97.
134. Id. at 596.
135. 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
136. Id. at 427. The Tidier court noted that it could have certified the question of state adop-
tion of the market share liability theory to state court but concluded that the record lacked suffi-
cient information to warrant certification. Id. at 424-26.
137. Id. at 424.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring federal courts sitting
in diversity to apply the law of the several states to the issues being litigated).
140. 116 N.J. 155, 561 A.2d 511 (1989).
141. Id. at 158, 561 A.2d at 512. In a similar case, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected use of
the market share liability theory against two DPT manufacturers in the context of a design defect.
Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (1988). The Senn court
claimed that the "adoption of any theory of alternative liability requires a profound change in
fundamental tort principles," which is more properly the domain of the legislature. Id. at 271, 751
P.2d at 223; see also Chapman v. American Cyanamid Co., 861 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that parents could not proceed against three DPT manufacturers on an alternative liabil-
ity theory where a child died after receiving a DPT vaccine). But see Morris v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (applying market share liability against manufacturers
of DPT based on allegations of industry manufacturing defects).
142. Shackil, 116 N.J. at 158, 561 A.2d at 512.
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unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the DPT vaccine she received.
As a result, the plaintiff sued a number of manufacturers that potentially
could have produced the vaccine she received and argued for adoption of a
market share liability theory. 4s The court determined that to adopt market
share liability in a DPT case "would frustrate overreaching public-policy and
public-health considerations by threatening the continued availability of
needed drugs and impairing the prospects of the development of safer vac-
cines. '" " The fact that Congress had already established a fund and a mecha-
nism to compensate plaintiffs the vaccine allegedly injured also influenced the
court's decision. 1'45
The largest area of cases in which plaintiffs have been largely unsuccessful
in attempting to impose market share liability has been in asbestos litiga-
tion.146 The main factor prohibiting application of the theory to asbestos cases
is that asbestos is not a fungible product. 4 Asbestos is a generic term for a
143. Id.
144. Id. The Shackil court also addressed the plaintiff's argument that there was a trend in
New Jersey to relax the causation requirement. Id. at 172, 561 A.2d at 519. The court noted that
in Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), a trial
court held that alternative liability based on percentage-share apportionment was permissible in a
DES case. However, the Ferrigno complaint was dismissed following the appellate court's opinion
in Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981), which refused to adopt alternative liability or enterprise liability in a DES action. Shackil.
116 N.J. at 174, 561 A.2d at 520-21. Upon further review of New Jersey law, the Shackil court
found that there was no trend toward wholesale adoption of market share liability. Id.
145. Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 185-86, 561 A.2d 511, 527 (1989); see
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300(aa)(l)-(34).
146. See Bateman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir. 1986);
Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that depar-
ture from traditional theories of tort liability must be made by Louisiana courts), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1102 (1984); Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Vigiolto
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (W.D. Pa. 1986); In re Related Asbestos Cases,
543 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (finding that market share liability is not an accurate
measure of liability in asbestos cases); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183,
190-91 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (finding the market share liability theory in asbestos cases contrary to the
Georgia rule that a manufacturer is not an insurer); Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 200
Cal. App. 3d 250, 257, 246 Cal. Rptr. 32, 37 (1988) (declining to extend market share liability to
asbestos-related injuries because asbestos is not a single fungible product carrying with it a singu-
lar risk factor); Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., 517 A.2d 690, 694 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting
market share liability and recognizing that such a change in tort law should be left to the legisla-
ture); Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Okla. 1987) (noting that "the public policy
favoring recovery on the part of an innocent plaintiff does not justify the abrogation of the rights
of a potential defendant to have a causative link proven between that defendant's specific tortious
acts and the plaintiff's injuries"); Gaulding v. Celotex, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 66, 71 (Tex. 1989) (not-
ing that market share liability cannot be applied because "the practical impossibility of determin-
ing where or when the product was marketed makes insurmountable the problem of identifying
the defendants' relevant market shares"). But see Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F.
Supp. 1353, 1359 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (holding Texas courts would adopt the theory because it
depends upon concurrent and alternative liability which are recognized in Texas), rev'd on other
grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
147. See Mullen, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 257, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
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family of minerals. Asbestos products have wide variances in toxicity depend-
ing on the amount of asbestos contained in the product; the greater the toxic-
ity, the greater the risk of harm." Therefore, establishing market shares
based on the amount of product a manufacturer supplied into the market
would not accurately reflect the amount of harm its product caused.
In Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,1 9 the Ohio Supreme Court
clearly articulated the reasons for which market share liability theory is re-
jected in asbestos cases.' 60 The Goldman court reasoned that market share
liability is inappropriate "in an asbestos litigation case, especially where it
cannot be shown that all the products to which the injured party was exposed
are completely fungible."' 5' The risk that the manufacturer created, the
Goldman court noted, is not accurately reflected in its market share because
many products contain different degrees of asbestos."' The court further rea-
soned that there would be difficulties with the theory as applied to asbestos
cases because the largest asbestos supplier, Johns-Manville, was not amenable
to suit.1'5 Instead of adopting a market share theory, the court concluded that
the problem required legislative solution.1
54
Plaintiffs in a less cohesive mixture of cases have likewise been unsuccessful
in their attempts to expand the doctrine of market share liability.155 In one
line of cases, courts have held that plaintiffs, injured by the explosion of mul-
tipiece truck wheels, could not use market share liability against the manufac-
turers.' These courts generally reason that the plaintiff failed to prove that
the product was defective. 7 Additionally, courts have found no proof that
each company's product shared the same defect.' 58 Manufacturers of clothing,
148. See id. at 256, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 36 (recognizing that six different asbestos silicates, each
with a different toxicity, exist in nature).
149. 33 Ohio St. 3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691 (1987).
150. Id. at 50-51, 514 NE.2d at 700-01 (involving an action against suppliers and manufactur-
ers of products containing asbestos by the wife of a man who died allegedly due to asbestos
exposure).
151. Id. at 50, 514 N.E.2d at 700.
152. Id. at 50-51, 514 N.E.2d at 700-01.
153. Id. at 51, 514 N.E.2d at 701.
154. Id.
155. One court, however, appears ready to extend the concept to a non-DES situation. See
Karibjanian v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 717 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1989). While ruling
on a motion to strike portions of complaint, a federal district court in Pennsylvania held that the
theory may apply in a case against the successor in interest to a manufacturer of Thorotrast X-ray
contrast medium. Id. at 1086. The court stated that liability may attach if the plaintiff proved
that only a few firms made the substance, that they all made it according to a common formula,
and that the product was indistinguishable from that of the others. Id.
156. See Bradley v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 590 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (D.S.D. 1984);
Tirey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 33 Ohio Misc. 2d 50, 52, 513 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1986);
Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 344 Pa. Super. 9, 26, 495 A.2d 963, 972 (1985).
157. E.g., Bradley, 590 F. Supp. at 1181 (noting plaintiff failed to show that all multipiece tire
rims were defective).
158. E.g., Tirey, 33 Ohio Misc. at 50, 513 N.E.2d at 827 (a multipiece wheel is not fungible);
Cummins, 344 Pa. Super. at 26, 495 A.2d at 972 (the multipiece tire and rim assemblies were not
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alleged to be unreasonably flammable, were held not liable under the market
share liability theory because the products were not sufficiently fungible.'59
The market share liability theory also was rejected in actions against the man-
ufacturers of a type of blood product from which plaintiff contracted AIDS, 60
the manufacturers of benzidine congener dyes,' 6' the manufacturers of Salk
polio vaccine,162 and the manufacturers of a breast prostheses. 63
V. ANALYSIS
As illustrated, a slim majority of state supreme courts have embraced the
market share liability theory in DES cases. The market share liability theory,
however, has been rejected in almost all other contexts. Furthermore, the five
courts that adopted some form of market share liability have criticized and
ultimately rejected, in whole or in part, the theory as developed in the other
jurisdictions. 6 4 Each adopting court has recognized that its version of the the-
sufficiently similar to be considered identical or fungible).
159. E.g., Mason v. Spiegel, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 401, 406 n.7 (D. Minn. 1985) (a cotton tennis
dress is not a fungible product that is intrinsically defective no matter who manufactured it);
Bixler v. Avondale Mills, 405 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that a cotton
flannelette is not a fungible product).
160. Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 696 F. Supp. 351, 354 (N.D. Ill. 1988). In Poole, the
court reasoned that the theory would not apply because the plaintiff had identified all possible
defendants, and because there was no indication that the Illinois courts would expand the theory
beyond DES cases. Id.
161. Griffin v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 964, 967 (D.N.C. 1986). The Griffin court
determined that it would constitute a quantum detour from existing North Carolina law to hold
defendants liable based on a market share theory. Id.
162. Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 192 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1983). The Shef-
field court reasoned that the defect was not a design defect, as in Sindell, but that a manufacturer
had distributed a defective product. Id. at 594, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 876. The court concluded that it
would be unfair to hold innocent manufacturers responsible for an injury caused by a tortfeasor
who manufactured the defective dosage. Id. at 599, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 880. Additionally, the Shef-
field court noted that, unlike Sindell, the delay in discovering the alleged causation was in no way
related to the nature of the defective product or any other act or omission of the unknown
tortfeasorn Id. at 594, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 877. Finally, the court stated that the application of
market share liability would subvert the important public policy of encouraging swift production
and marketing of new pharmaceutical products. Id. at 597-98, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 878-79.
163. Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. 721 F. Supp. 89, 94 (D. Md. 1989) (the product was not
inherently dangerous, and there were warnings provided concerning possible complications), aff d,
898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990).
164. E.g., Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 285 (Fla. 1990) (criticizing other courts
for not having a due diligence requirement); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 509-
11, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076-78, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 948-50 (noting that "determining market
shares under Sindell proved difficult and engendered years of litigation," while the Collins ap-
proach is not feasible to apply in a state having a large number of DES cases), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 350 (1989); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 601-02, 689 P.2d 368, 380-
81 (1984) (criticizing Sindell for failing to define a substantial share of the relevant market);
Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 189-91, 342 N.W.2d 37, 48-49 (reasoning that the
Sindell unalloyed market share theory is limited in practical application because market share is
difficult to define and prove), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
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ory may be flawed, but adopted the market theory anyway, believing that sub-
sequent opinions would refine the concept. 6 ' Nevertheless, after a decade of
refining, the courts recognize that they apparently have been unable to resolve
many of the problems with the concept.166 Courts should not be swayed to
adopt market share liability, or one of the slightly altered variations of it,
based on the strong emotional appeal to provide injured plaintiffs with a rem-
edy. The theory is not only infirm, it is also a marked deviation from useful
tort principles.
A. Criticisms of the Procedures Adopted for Implementing Market Share
Liability
Market share liability represents one of the most important, if not one of the
most radical, developments in tort law in the past decade. It has understanda-
bly been the subject of criticism.""7 Market share liability defendants and
some commentators have argued that the whole concept is flawed.' 68 The flaws
associated with the overall concept of market share liability will be addressed
later in the Article. This section discusses the flaws associated with the proce-
dural elements of market share liability.
165. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1074-75, 751 P.2d 470, 485, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 427-28 (1988) (recognizing that the California Supreme Court's articulation of market
share liability did not disclose whether defendants are jointly or severally liable); George v. Parke-
Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 592, 733 P.2d 507, 512 (1987) (noting that the adoption of a very small
market makes liability determination almost impossible).
The Sindell decision has not been widely accepted. Justice Richardson, joined by two other
justices, dissented in Sindell, arguing that the majority was abandoning a traditional tort require-
ment for the creation of a new modified industry-wide tort. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.
3d 588, 617, 607 P.2d 924, 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting), cert denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980). Justice Richardson alleged that the theory would result in imposition of
liability based on pure conjecture and that the theory rewarded the plaintiff who, unlike the ordi-
nary plaintiff, no longer has to take the chance that the responsible defendant cannot be reached
or is unable to respond financially. Id. at 618, 607 P.2d at 911, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149. Therefore,
"it is readily apparent that 'market share' liability will fall unevenly and disproportionately upon
those manufacturers who are amenable to.suit in (those few jurisdictions which adopt some form
of the theory)." Id. at 617, 607 P.2d at 940. 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148. The Sindell dissent stressed
that the decision has the effect of making pharmaceutical companies insurers of their industry and
that because of the sweeping effect of market share liability, the policy decision to introduce and
define it should rest not with the court but with the legislature. Id. at 621, 607 P.2d at 942-43,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51
166. E.g., George, at 593, 733 P.2d at 512 (altering the relevant market in Washington from a
local market to a regional market).
167. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 251, 560 N.E.2d 324, 337 (1990) (conclud-
ing that the market share liability theory is too great a deviation from existing tort law); Zafft v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Mo. 1984) (noting that the actual wrongdoer may not be
brought to court under the market share liability theory).
168. See, e.g., Smith, 137 II1. 2d at 262, 560 N.E.2d at 341 (defendants arguing that expansion
of tort law would chill production of useful drugs); Fisher, supra note 28, at 1654 (concluding
that adoption of market share liability will dramatically increase litigation costs); Comment,
supra note 1, at 300 (concluding that the market share liability theory creates more injustice than
it eliminates by completely divorcing liability from responsibility).
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The first procedural component in a market share liability case is the identi-
fication of defendants. The California market share liability theory requires
the plaintiff to name defendants having a "substantial share" of the market, 69
while the market share liability theories of the three other states require the
plaintiff to name only one defendant.170 One criticism specific to the California
"substantial share" requirement is that the Sindell court failed to define what
constitutes a "substantial share" of the market, such that the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant.' 7 ' The law review article that the court relied upon
suggested that the plaintiff join seventy-five to eighty percent of the manufac-
turers. 2 The court, though, rejected this percentage as too high and held that
only a substantial percentage share is required.
1 7 3
The three other state supreme courts only require the plaintiff to sue one
defendant. 174 However, without the requirement that a "substantial share" of
the market be present, perhaps at least fifty percent of the market, there is the
realistic potential of creating liability disproportionate to the amount of dam-
age a manufacturer caused, especially if only a small manufacturer or a few
small manufacturers are joined. If a substantial share is joined, there is at
least a likelihood that one of the defendants before the court caused the inju-
ries. Without the substantial share requirement, one manufacturer or a hand-
ful of manufacturers could continually be named defendants and be forced to
pay damages. Consider what could happen if the sole defendant is a small
169. See Sindell. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
170. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 511-12, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941, 950, cert. denied, I10 S. Ct. 350 (1989); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102
Wash. 2d 581, 605, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 193,
342 N.W.2d 37, 50, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
171. See Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 601-02, 689 P.2d at 380-81 (criticizing Sindell for failing to
define a substantial share of the relevant market); Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 193, 342 N.W.2d at 50
(noting that it is too difficult to define what is a reasonable number of defendants).
In addition to criticizing California for failing to define substantial share, the Martin court also
stated, mistakenly, that the California theory distorted liability by providing that the defendants
comprising the "substantial market share" bear joint responsibility for 100% of the plaintiff's
injuries. Martin, 102 Wash. at 602, 689 P.2d at 380-81. But see Brown v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d
1049, 1075, 751 P.2d 470, 487, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 428 (1988) (noting that the DES plaintiff
does not necessarily receive a 100% award and that imposing joint liability upon defendants
would frustrate the Sindell court's goal of achieving a balance between the injured plaintiff and
DES manufacturers).
172. Comment, supra note 4, at 996. The Comment proposed that the plaintiff should be re-
quired to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the product manufactured by one of the
defendants caused the injuries. Id. Specifically, the Comment noted that "[t]he standard of clear
and convincing evidence is met by joining those manufacturers that accounted for a high percent-
age of the defective products on the market, approximately 75% to 80%." Id.
173. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 145, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); cf Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 40 Cal. 3d 672,
684, 710 P.2d 247, 255, 221 Cal. Rptr. 447, 455 (1985) (holding that to allow a plaintiff to
proceed against a defendant who manufactured only 10% of the market share was insufficient as
a matter of law).
174. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing the defendant identification re-
quirements of New York, Washington, and Wisconsin).
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contributor to the DES market. This manufacturer could possibly shoulder
complete liability, without proof of it being the cause in fact of the injury; in
fact, the great likelihood will be that the manufacturer did not cause the plain-
tiff's injuries. For example, under the Washington procedure, a small company
that no longer has records of its actual market share is given a presumptive
share which equals the portion of the damages unattributed.175 Thus, that
company could be responsible for seventy-five percent or more of the damages,
when common sense dictates that a small company surely could not have dis-
tributed such a high percentage of the DES used in the market.
Defendants assigned presumptive shares are also held liable for the share of
the market attributable to companies no longer in business or not otherwise
amenable to suit. 176 Defendants who are amenable to suit become insurers of
the products that other manufacturers, not amenable to suit, made and mar-
keted. Therefore, a market share liability theory that does not require the
identification of a substantial number of defendants can be substantially unfair
to any company that is unable to prove its market share, especially if that
company is small.
Another criticism of the procedures developed is that each theory, other
than New York's,177 fails to identify the relevant market-the local area, the
county, the state, or the nation-for purposes of determining a particular de-
fendant's market share. 178 The relevant market area is important because a
manufacturer's liability will vary widely depending on which market is used.179
The courts adopting the theory claimed that market share liability approxi-
mates each defendant's responsibility for the injuries its own product
caused.18 However, these assertions are undermined by the fact that, depend-
ing on the chosen market, there is this potential for extreme variance in liabil-
ity.181 Furthermore, each state's theory fails to specify how the market for
175. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
176. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 255, 560 N.E.2d 324, 338 (1990). The Smith
Court noted: "If we were to allow courts and juries to apportion damages when reliable informa-
tion is not available, the clear result would be that the determination will be arbitrary and there
will be wide variances between judgements ... ." Id.
177. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
178. E.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 194, 342 N.W.2d 37, 48-49 (indicating
that proof that plaintiff's mother took the type of DES a single defendant manufactured was
insufficient to recover full damages from the sole defendant), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
179, For example, a manufacturer that supplied DES primarily to the East Coast would have a
small West Coast sales exposure. If the manufacturer were sued in Washington, the manufacturer
would be exposed to a small potential liability if the relevant market is the West Coast. A relevant
market consisting of the entire United States would expose the manufacturer to a larger potential
liability.
180. See Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 606, 689 P.2d 368, 383 (1984)
(noting that no defendant will be held liable for damages it statistically could not have caused if
all defendants prove their market share).
181. See Fischer, supra note 28, at 1642-44 (if a defendant's liability varies depending on the
market used, the goal of apportioning liability fairly according to its market share will be unat-
tainable); see also George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 592, 733 P.2d 507, 512 (1987) (the
purpose of market share is met by using the narrowest market possible).
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DES can be allocated fairly when DES was prescribed for uses other than as a
miscarriage preventative.1 82 Failure to account for the diverse uses of DES
exacerbates the improbability that the market share theory apportions liability
in any way that approximates the injuries each defendant caused.
The Wisconsin provision that holds a single named defendant who can not
prove market share 100% liable for a plaintiff's injury, in particular, is subject
to criticism. The Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized that it was adopting
the concept due, in part, to the fact that the defendant created a risk of
harm.18 The other courts adopting market share liability did not go so far as
to impose potentially total liability on a single defendant merely for creating a
risk of harm.1 84 The Collins decision contravenes the principle that a mere
possibility that a defendant is the responsible party is insufficient to satisfy
causation. 185 It is possible, therefore, under the Wisconsin theory that the de-
fendant's liability will far exceed the probability that it caused the injuries.
The Wisconsin court, in Collins, also rejected "unalloyed market share,"' 86
concluding that it "does not constitute the most desirable course to follow in
DES cases because the theory, while conceptually attractive, is limited in
practical applicability.' 87 The Collins court found that defining the market
and apportioning the market share are almost impossible to accomplish fairly
and accurately because of the insufficiency of the data on market shares, and
because a second mini-trial to determine market share would waste judicial
resources. 8 While this observation may be true, it has been pointed out that
the Collins single defendant method does not resolve the perceived errors in
allocating market share.' 8  Moreover, under the court's procedure, the errors
are compounded by inundating a jury with a mass of information and by ad-
ding a trial on the separate issue of apportioning liability.' 90
The New York Court of Appeals recently declined to accept Wisconsin's
182. See Miller & Hancock, supra note 8, at 88-91 (the authors argue that the difficulty in
accurately establishing market share, especially one which will identify the manufacturers whose
drug was used as a miscarriage preventative, undermines the claim that liability will equal the
damage a manufacturer caused over the run of cases); see also Note, The DES Causation Conun-
drum, supra note 7, at 959-60 (analyzing flaws in the market share concept).
183. Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 191, 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (emphasis in origi-
nal), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
184. The New York and Washington theories provide that one defendant may be presumed to
be liable for 100% of the plaintiff's injury and the presumptive share can be reduced or extin-
guished by naming or joining other defendants, by exculpation, or by proving actual market share.
See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 512, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d
941, 950, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989); Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 605-07, 689 P.2d at 383.
185. See Note, The DES Causation Conundrum, supra note 7, at 965-66 (imposition of liabil-
ity just for creating the risk of harm requires a substantial reduction in the degree of proof tradi-
tionally required and thus threatens overdeterrence and inequity).
186. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 189, 342 N.W.2d at 48.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 189-90, 342 N.W.2d at 48.
189. Miller & Hancock, supra note 8, at 99-101.
190. E.g., id. (litigation costs will increase, there is a risk of overwhelming the jurors with
evidence, and the Sindell mini-trial is transformed into a maxi-trial on a plethora of issues).
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risk contribution theory, believing that it would only be feasible on a limited
scale.19 ' The New York court was wary "of setting loose, for application in the
hundreds of cases pending in this State, a theory which requires the fact
finder's individualized and open-ended assessment of the relative liabilities of
scores of defendants in every case."' 19 The court concluded that the injustice
resulting from delays in recoveries and inconsistent results militated against
adoption of the theory. 9 '
B. Inability to Reconstruct the Defendant's Market Shares
There are numerous problems with the overall concept of market share lia-
bility aside from those concerning the procedures each court developed to im-
pliment its theory. A major flaw with DES cases is that there is only a small
amount of, or in some cases no reliable information available to establish the
defendants' percentages of the market. No party can be blamed for the lack of
information. The lack of information is, in part, the result of the inadequacy of
the laws in effect regarding maintenance of records. Other factors relate to the
long lapse in time from the sale of the drug to the filing of the lawsuit. Besides
the lack of records for existing manufacturers, many of those defendants
named in the lawsuits are no longer in business. 94 For these companies espe-
cially, it is unlikely that records are available to establish their share of any
market. The lack of available records is evidenced by the fact that after exten-
sive discovery, many plaintiffs are unable to identify the responsible manufac-
turer or even to narrow it to a likely group of defendants. Unfortunately, the
courts that have adopted market share liability have done so while ruling on
pretrial motions. 9  These courts have not had the benefit of hearing evidence
regarding the unavailability of market share data before ruling on whether or
not to adopt the market share liability theory.1 96
191. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 511, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1077-78, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941, 949-50, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. E.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 II. 2d 222, 254, 560 N.E.2d 324, 337-38 (1990)
(noting 63 of 81 manufacturers were not before the court and that market share records are not
available due to mergers within the industry).
195. E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 595-96, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 134 (deciding whether defendant's demurrers for failure to identify a defendant were
properly granted by the trial court), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Smith, 137 Ill. 2d at 252,
560 N.E.2d at 337 (recognizing that the four courts which have adopted the market share liability
theory have done so while ruling on pretrial motions).
196. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46 (stating that
the court was "not unmindful of the practical problems involved in defining the market and deter-
mining market share, but these are largely matters of proof which properly cannot be determined
at the pleading stage of these proceedings"); see also Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash.
2d 581, 586, 689 P.2d 368, 372 (1984) (the case was on review after the trial judge ruled on
motions for summary judgment); Miller & Hancock, supra note 8, at 88-89 (criticizing the
Sindell court for adopting a theory when it was obviously unaware of the capability needed to
implement it).
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The experiences of trial courts in California, directed by the Sindell court to
apply the market share liability theory, exemplify the problems courts will
encounter in determining market shares. The Smith court noted that Califor-
nia trial judges, in In re Complex DES Litigation,197 attempted to define the
relevant market as narrowly as possible. 98 After extensive discovery proceed-
ings, the parties were unable to present data on a narrow market. Therefore,
the judge determined that the only practical relevant market was a national
market." Likewise, the Smith court noted that another California court, in
Stapp v. Abbott Laboratories,"'0 expressed exasperation with the task of at-
tempting to formulate market shares after spending over four weeks examin-
ing the DES market. 01 The Stapp court concluded that there simply was no
such market share data. 20 2 The Stapp court criticized the courts that devel-
oped the market share concept for adopting the theory despite their obvious
lack of trial experience and lack of knowledge as to what would go into prov-
ing a case based on the theory.208
The Hymowitz court, though, was aware of the problems other jurisdictions had faced with
their market share liability theories but proceeded to adopt the theory anyway. Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 509, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 947-48 (stating
that "it is noteworthy that determining market shares under Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
proved difficult and engendered years of litigation"), cert. denied. 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
197. See Smith, 137 I1. 2d at 283, 560 N.E.2d at 352 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing In re
Complex DES Litigation, No. 830-109, General Order No. 8 (Cal. Super. Ct. of San Francisco
County, Feb. 7, 1985)).
198. Id. In order to approximate damages to the injury caused, the market should be defined as
narrowly as possible. George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 592, 733 P.2d 507, 512 (1987).
199. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 283, 560 N.E.2d 324, 352 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(citing In re Complex DES Litigation, No. 830-109, General Order No. 8 (Cal. Super. Ct. of San
Francisco County, Feb. 7, 1985)).
200. Id. at 252-53, 560 N.E.2d at 337 (citing Stapp v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C 344407
(Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County)).
201. See id. The Stapp judge stated that "[t]he harsh blunt fact that the evidence has shown is
that that information and data is just not available" and "when the Supreme Court, . . . without
having any evidence says that you can determine what the [sales are] as to a particular manufac-
turer, it's just, just not there. That data doesn't exist". Id. The Smith court noted that the Los
Angeles judge had the benefit of experienced lawyers, the unlimited resources of the parties to
attempt to obtain the information, and apparently full cooperation of everyone involved. On the
record, the judge thanked the parties for all their cooperation and for the highly professional
manner in which the case was presented. Id. at 253, 560 N.E.2d 337-38.
202. The trial judge did develop a partial national market analysis but only after a great
amount of time and expense was incurred. Rheingold, supra note 25, at 895 (The market share
analysis was based partially on testimony of many economists "giving what apparently amounted
to nothing more than educated guesses about what the market share was.").
203. The judge in Stapp stated:
[T]he a author of the Fordham Comment is.in the same position that the Supreme
Court was in Sindell; it had never taken one minute's evidence. And it's apparent that
whoever wrote that comment doesn't know anything about the DES drug industry, to
put it bluntly.
[T]hat article in the Fordham Comment needs to be preceded by a big caution in bold
faced type: "This article was written by somebody who has never tried a case, never
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Those who support the market share liability theory, and those courts that
developed it, did so believing that attributing damages in proportion to the
percentage of DES a manufacturer supplied in a narrow market would, over
the run of cases, result in holding each defendant responsible for the amount
of harm its own product caused.""4 Thus, the causation in fact element was
preserved as much as possible. It is highly unlikely, however, that market
share liability can meet the goal of apportioning damages in the context of
DES cases.
A truly reliable market share calculation must be limited to an accurate
reflection of the amount of DES a manufacturer supplied into the market.
Such an accurate determination of market share apparently cannot be
achieved.205 Moreover, any market share determination must be limited to the
amount of DES the manufacturer sold for use in preventing miscarriages. This
narrow market is appropriate because the drug was, and is, safe for the other
purposes for which it was sold.2°0 The task of determining market share is
especially awesome in the case of DES sales because of its widespread use and
because of the long period of time over which it was prescribed. 0 7 To recon-
struct the market and apportion liability accurately, evidence must be
presented detailing each defendant's percentage of the relevant market for a
specific year, overlapping years, or span of years. For instance, if a plaintiff's
mother, for some reason, took DES intermittently over a period of three years
before the plaintiff's birth, the trial court will have to reconstruct the market
shares of each defendant for each year. In addition, DES cases have generally
been consolidated before a single trial judge for docket management purposes.
The judge has the difficult task of developing the various market shares for the
numerous defendants and years involved in the multitude of DES cases before
the court.208 This can mean reconstructing the sales data for thirty or more
manufacturers for any number of years between 1947 and 1971.
Unfortunately, reconstructing these narrow markets can be nearly impossi-
gotten evidence in the courtroom, or anyplace else, and it's a theoretical, hypothetical
article."
Stapp v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C 344 407 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County).
204. See supra note 86.
205. In Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Wisconsin Supreme Court said that "[w]e view defining
the market and apportioning market share as a near impossible task if it is to be done fairly and
accurately in order to approximate the probability that defendant caused the plaintiff's injury."
116 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 342 N.W.2d 37, 48, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). The Collins court
further noted that drug companies have not kept or cannot locate records concerning when, where,
and what type of DES they sold. Additionally, a plaintiff does not usually have her mother's
prescription records. Id. at 181, 342 N.W.2d at 44. All the problems are a result of the passage of
a long period of time between the DES ingestion and recognition of the injury. Id.
206. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing the various uses for DES).
207. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing the widespread use of DES).
208. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1055, 751 P.2d 470, 473, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 412, 415 (1988) (noting that the judge was responsible for administering 69 DES cases each
naming about 170 drug companies as defendants); see also Rheingold, supra note 25, at 894-896
(discussing the consolidated cases in New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco).
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ble due to the scant amount of market data that remains available. If courts
and juries are allowed to apportion damages when reliable information is not
available, the clear result will be arbitrary determinations and wide variances
between judgments, without sufficient explanation for these differences. 09 This
unpredictability makes it difficult for manufacturers to insure against liability
and to reach reasoned settlements in pending suits. 10 Additionally, states that
adopt market share liability place a burden on their trial courts and the par-
ties involved to determine market shares. This burden bogs down trial courts
and creates for them an almost futile endeavor. The burden of establishing
market shares based on unreliable or insufficient data also comes at a tremen-
dous cost to the court system and to litigants, both monetarily and in terms of
manpower.211
Contributing to the misperception regarding the ability to reconstruct mar-
kets is the implicit contention that defendants amenable to suit can establish
their true market shares. Throughout the history of the use of DES as a mis-
carriage preventative, hundreds of manufacturers produced the product. It is
impossible to bring them all before a single court. The defendants who do
appear in court face the difficult burden of proving their market share. Those
who cannot meet this task, but who still desire to reduce their potential liabil-
ity, will have the even more difficult burden of establishing market shares of
codefendants or unnamed manufacturers." The likely result of the failure of
market share proof will be that those companies that are amenable to suit, but
unable to establish their market share, will be liable for a wholly speculative
and disproportionate amount of the damages.1 Instead of having every DES
manufacturer pay damages that, in the long run, approximate the harm the
manufacturer caused, the market share theory places liability on only the
small percentage of the many DES manufacturers that are still viable and
209. See Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 189-90, 342 N.W.2d at 48 (the unavailability of data on
market shares makes it impossible to apportion damages accurately or fairly).
210. See Fine, A Personal Perspective from the "Manufacturer," 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 899,
902 (1989); Kroll, supra note 8, at 196.
211. See Fischer, supra note 28, at 1657 (stating that the "legal fees and administrative costs
arising from litigation of this magnitude easily could rival the cost of the plaintiff's judgment");
Comment, supra note 1, at 323-26 (discussing the effects on the cost of litigation of joining many
defendants, shifting the burden of proof to the defendants, and involving the court in the issue of
defining and evaluating the relevant market).
212. See, e.g., George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d 584, 597, 733 P.2d 502, 514 (1987) (re-
quiring defendants to establish the actual market share of impleaded defendants in order to inhibit
defendants from randomly impleading insolvent corporations to reduce their share of presumptive
liability).
213. See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1007, 1018 (D.S.C. 1981) (finding
it to be too speculative to impose liability when quite possibly the proper defendant was not before
the court); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 616, 607 P.2d 924, 939-40, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 147-48 (1980) (Richardson, J., dissenting) (finding it highly speculative that defend-
ant's liability equaled the harm actually caused), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Fischer,





One contention that may support adoption of market share and may over-
come some of the problems discussed is, that after a number of jurisdictions
have grappled with developing market shares, there will become a pool of gen-
erally accepted market share data for the various DES manufacturers. Such a
proposition, however, is not accurate. Any generally accepted data that courts
develop will likely be established for those few large companies that are still
viable and amenable to suit. Also, any generally accepted data will most likely
be only for large manufacturers' national market shares. Under each adopted
market share liability theory, except for New York's, the trial court first at-
tempts to determine the local market share-that is the market shares of the
defendants who participated in a specific neighborhood, county, region of the
state, or whole state.21' Thus, regardless of a manufacturer's national market,
if suits are brought throughout the country, the incentive and the burden will
remain for a manufacturer to attempt to establish a more localized market
share.
Even if the trial courts agree to accept only data on national market shares,
inevitably disagreement will arise about these markets.215 For example, after
extensive discovery and hearings, a San Francisco California court developed
national market shares for the years involved in the cases before it.21 6 How-
ever, the litigants in a New York DES case declined to accept these figures.21
The New York court is now attempting to construct its own market share
figures. Subsequently, the San Francisco court decided to relitigate the market
share issue because of perceived errors in its calculation., 18
Last, the national market data will inevitably be flawed due to the lack of
reliable information. Market share figures likely will not include all the com-
panies brought before each court or will not include the many companies no
longer amenable to suit.
214. See supra notes 82-86 (discussing the procedure for determining market share).
215. See Wilner & Bayer, supra note 90, at 156 (defendants will not be able to collaterally
estop plaintiffs from litigating the proper market shares and rely on already established computa-
tions because the plaintiffs were not litigants in the prior lawsuit that determined the market
shares).
216. After years of discovery and hearings, the San Francisco court developed a matrix that
showed the market share for each dosage strength of each company. See Rheingold, supra note
25, at 894.
217. Id. at 894-95. The plaintiffs in New York rejected this matrix because it assigned rela-
tively low market shares to the companies. Id. According to the plaintiffs:
many suppliers listed in the matrix cannot be sued in New York, or have since gone
out of business, or have been taken over by successor companies who cannot be sued,
or have gone bankrupt . . . . Even as to a defendant who can be sued, not all plain-
tiffs sued all available defendant in their cases in New York.
Id.
218. Id. at 895.
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C. Tort Principles Used to Justify Adoption of Market Share Liability
Irrespective of the lack of reliable market share data, the underlying policy
goals of market share liability do not justify adoption of the theory. Propo-
nents of the theory argue that certain policy considerations of negligence and
strict liability law compel courts to adopt market share liability. Although tort
law must remain viable to impose liability on the responsible manufacturer or
manufacturers, market share liability either does not effectuate the principles
and policy reasons offered as justification, or, to the extent market share the-
ory achieves tort law goals, the proposed reasons are insufficient to warrant
adoption of the concept.2 19
219. In addition to relying on policy considerations analogous to negligence and strict liability,
some courts have supported their conclusion that market share should be adopted based in part on
analogies to two other causation exceptions, res ipsa loquitur and alternative liability. See Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 602-03, 607 P.2d 924, 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 139, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); see also Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 1, 23, 527
N.E.2d 333, 346-48 (1988) (relying on an analogy to res ipsa loquitur to justify shifting the
burden of proving causation in DES cases to defendants), rev'd, 137 Ill. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324
(1990). Under these exceptions to the identification requirement, the burden of identifying the
culpable defendant is shifted from the plaintiff to defendants. If they cannot establish the respon-
sible party, then all defendants share responsibility for the injuries. Res ipsa loquitur developed to
allow the plaintiff to establish negligence circumstantially when direct evidence concerning the
cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant. In order to invoke
the theory and take advantage of the inference of negligence on the defendant's behalf, the plain-
tiff must show that she was injured (1) in an occurrence that would not have occurred in the
absence of negligence; (2) by an instrumentality or agency under the management or control of
the defendant; and (3) under circumstances which were not due to any voluntary act or negligence
on the part of the plaintiff. Kolakowski v. Voris, 83 I1. 2d 388, 394, 415 N.E.2d 397, 400 (1980).
Regarding alternative liability, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "(w]here the
conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the
plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is
upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433B(3) (1965).
There are three important distinctions between these exceptions and market share liability. Res
ipsa loquitur and alternative liability require naming all potentially responsible defendants. Nam-
ing all possible defendants helps to preserve the identification element of causation in fact because
liability will surely fall on the actual wrongdoer. By contrast, market share liability merely re-
quires the plaintiff to name as defendants either manufacturers having a substantial share of the
market or, with some theories, only one manufacturer who was in the market. See supra notes 67-
73; see also Smith, 137 11. 2d at 257-58, 560 N.E.2d at 339-40. The Smith court noted:
As a result, there is a real possibility that the defendant actually responsible for the
injuries is not before the court. Second, in res ipsa loquitur and alternative liability,
burden-shifting is considered equitable because.defendants are typically in a better
position than the plaintiff to determine who caused the harm. Market share liability
shifts the burden to defendants without regard to whether plaintiff [or defendant] is
better able to identify the defendant responsible or without regard to defendants' abil-
ity to identify who among them is actually responsible. As is clearly demonstrated in
these DES cases, the manufacturers are in no better position than the plaintiffs to
identify the culpable party.
Third, in the earlier exceptions the burden is shifted to parties who bear some cul-
pability for causing plaintiff's injury. In alternative liability, each defendant was at
806
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The Sindell court relied upon two policy reasons for adopting market share
liability: (1) as between an innocent plaintiff and a manufacturer of a defec-
tive product, the manufacturer should bear the cost of injury; and (2) as be-
tween the injured plaintiff and the possibly responsible manufacturer, the
manufacturer is better able to absorb the cost of the injury.2  These two pol-
icy reasons are also cited to justify imposition of strict products liability. 1
The courts that followed Sindell in adopting the market share liability also
justified adoption of the theory based in part on these policy reasons.2
However, eight years after Sindell, in Brown v. Superior Court,23 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that prescription drugs should be exempt from
strict liability; in so holding, the Brown court adopted comment k of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts section 402A for determining the liability of a
pharmaceutical manufacturer. 22 4 Brown held that, in general, "so long as the
least negligent toward the plaintiff, and in res ipsa loquitur at least one defendant
caused the injury and the others are intimately connected to the activity and instru-
mentality that caused the harm. But with market share liability the named defendant
need not have been directly connected with the activity or instrumentality that caused
the harm. Indeed it is inevitable that some defendants wholly innocent of wrongdoing
towards the particular plaintiff will shoulder part or all of the responsibility for the
injury caused.
Id.; Comment, supra note 1, at 307-12.
220. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
221. See AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 9:30 (1987) (noting that "the same
reasons of policy which were the impetus for the creation of the doctrine of strict liability have
been said to support adoption of market-share liability as well"); see also Brown v. Superior
Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1060 n.5, 751 P.2d 470, 476 n.5, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 n.5 (1988)
(noting that the court adopted the market share liability theory in Sindell based upon policy
considerations related to strict tort liability).
222. See Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 604, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (1984);
Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 191-92, 342 N.W.2d 37, 49, cert. denied, 469 U.S.
826 (1984).
223. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
224. Id. at 1061, 751 P.2d at 477, 245 Cal. Rptr, at 418. Aware of the potential negative effect
on research that strict liability would have on the drug industry, the Restatement's drafters origi-
nally considered excluding drug manufacturers from the scope of § 402A. However, this proposal
was rejected; instead, comment k was added. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment k (1965). See generally, Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1057-58, 751 P.2d at 475, 245 Cal. Rptr.
at 416 (reviewing the history of § 402A); Note, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and the Design
Defect Theory: An Analysis of Applying Comment K to Strict Liability and Negligence Claims,
15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1049, 1053-55 (1989) (discussing the history and public policy under-
lying comment k); Comment, Brown v. Superior Court: A Tonic for Prescription Drug Manufac-
turers, 16 WASH. ST. U.L. REV. 753 (1989) (discussing comment k pi'otection). Comment k pro-
vides an exception to the strict liability rule in the case of certain unavoidably unsafe products.
The full text of comment k provides: -
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding ex-
ample is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads
to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine
1991]
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drug involved was properly prepared and accompanied by warnings of its dan-
gerous propensities that were either known or reasonably scientifically knowa-
ble at the time of distribution," a manufacturer is not strictly liable. 225 As
shown earlier, market share liability is a theory that has essentially been lim-
ited to actions against manufacturers of DES, a prescription drug.226 Interest-
ingly, when California, the first state to adopt market share liability, explained
its reasons for accepting market share, the court relied on policy reasons un-
derlying strict liability. 227 Nevertheless, in Brown, a later California case, the
California Supreme Court held that in an action under market share liability,
the plaintiff could not rely on an action sounding in strict liability. 228 In Cali-
fornia, a plaintiff can now recover under the market share liability theory only
by proceeding under a negligence cause of action.229
The California court's legal reasoning is patently unsound. First, the court
legitimized the adoption of market share liability based on the policy reasons
supporting strict liability, and then the court later declared that the market
share theory should not be used in a strict liability action. In the meantime,
the subsequent courts that adopted market share liability unwisely accepted
are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they
involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many
other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally
be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which because of lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or
perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The
seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared
and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to
be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desira-
ble product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
However, comment k protection was held not to apply to DES in Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116
Wis. 2d 166, 197, 342 N.W.2d 37, 52, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). The court recognized
that in some exigent circumstances it may be necessary to place a drug on the market before
adequate testing could be done, but it found that no exigent circumstances existed that would
warrant DES receiving comment k protection. Id.
225. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069, 751 P.2d at 482-83, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
226. See supra notes 140-63 and accompanying text (summarizing cases, other than the DES
cases, where market share liability has been considered).
227. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144 (discussing strict tort liability policy considerations), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); see also Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1060 n.5, 751 P.2d at 476 n.5, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417 n.5
(indicating that only policies, and not the cause of action, were based on strict liability cause of
action).
228. Brown v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1061, 751 P.2d 470, 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418
(1988).
229. Id. at 1059, 751 P.2d at 475-76, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (noting that the principle expressed
in comment k is based on negligence).
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the underlying policy reasons for adopting market share without analyzing
whether the policies support adoption of the concept. After scrutinizing the
policy reasons, it appears doubtful that they do sufficiently support adoption of
the market share liability theory.
As noted, one policy consideration relied upon in adopting the theory is that
drug companies are better able to absorb the costs of the injury by insuring
against liability and passing the costs on.280 Linked with this principle is the
contention that the pharmaceutical drug companies are in solid financial con-
dition and, therefore, are able to afford insurance to cover the costs. Manufac-
turers have strongly contested the figures and conclusions regarding their fi-
nancial status, or any implication that one company's solid position reflects the
security of other participants in the drug manufacturing industry. 31 The pro-
ducers further contend that expansions in tort law, such as the adoption of
market share liability, have the perverted result of eliminating production of
certain useful and necessary drugs.232 Additionally, manufacturers contend
that adoption of market share liability dramatically increases insurance costs
to such an extent that some companies either can no longer obtain insurance
or cannot pass the costs on to consumers, while other companies can no longer
survive. 3
There are a number of examples of drugs that are no longer produced be-
cause of increased product costs related to potential liability. For example,
Oculinum and Benedectin were considered safe and useful but are no longer
available to the public because manufacturers cannot afford to insure their
sale of the drugs.23 The federal government has interceded in some cases to
protect companies from liability, in order to insure availability of a drug. For
instance, the government intervened to insure availability of the swine flu and
230. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
231. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 136 Ill. 2d 222, 260, 560 N.E.2d 324, 341 (1990).
232. Id. (noting that the defendant listed drugs that were no longer made due to the potential
liability of the manufacturers).
233. See Fine, supra note 210, at 902; Comment, supra note 224, at 766-67 (reiterating the
Brown court's reasoning that strict liability would be expensive to drug manufacturers, resulting in
fewer products being available to the public); Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method,
supra note 7, at 576-77 (indicating that the inability of drug manufacturers to obtain liability
insurance is the most persuasive argument manufacturers have against the adoption of the market
share liability theory); see also Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 178-79, 561 A.2d
511, 523 (1989) (discussing the fragility of the DPT market as a result of the increasing insurance
costs).
234. See Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412, 421, (1988); Note, A Question of Competence. The Judicial Role in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REv. 773, 774 (1990); Benedectin Production Ends, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 14, 1985, at A22, col. 6 (reporting Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical halted Benedectin manu-
facturing); Loss of Drug Relegates Many to Blindness, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1986, § C, at I, col.
3 (reporting that a manufacturer stopped manufacturing an experimental drug useful in treating
eye problems due to liability exposure). Another area where the high cost of insurance and re-
search has essentially shut down development and research in the United States has been in the
contraceptive industry. Note, supra, at 775 n.I I.
1991]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 40:771
polio vaccines. 235 The New Jersey Supreme Court voiced this same concern
when it declined, on policy grounds, to impose market share liability on manu-
facturers of DPT because of the crippling effect potential liability would have
on the availability of the vaccine.2"'
Surely, broadening manufacturers' liability exposure through market share
liability will have the concomitant effect of negatively impacting drug availa-
bility. 37 Manufacturers will need to insure against losses arising from the sale
of their own products as well as the products of others in the industry, most of
whom are no longer in existence. Even if a manufacturer decides not to insure
against losses, it will still be obliged to cover the costs of any damage awards.
This added potential for liability will likely contribute to a reduction of the
number of participants in the market and the availability of drugs, as well as a
decline in the amount of new drug research.2"8 It may be tempting to impose
liability based on the fact that these manufacturers profited from the sale of a
drug that may be responsible for the plaintiff's injuries, regardless of their
actual ability to cover these costs. However, this temptation alone is not a
sufficiently compelling reason to adopt a theory that significantly alters a
state's tort law, while only providing a clearly flawed alternative.3 9 Likewise,
235. See National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat.
1113 (1976) (requiring the government to pay damages for injuries caused by nonnegligently
manufactured vaccine) (current version 42 U.S.C. § 247(b) (1988)). See generally Brown, 44 Cal.
3d at 1064, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421 (the government assumed liability for injuries
after drug manufacturers refused to make the drug).
236. See Shackil, 116 N.J. at 190, 561 A.2d at 529 (DPT industry was diminished to one
supplier, and the federal government had to establish a fund to deal with liability claims); see also
Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis Vaccine Shortage, 253 J. A.M.A. 1540 (1985) (noting that there
was a temporary shortage of DPT vaccine supplied by the sole manufacturer).
237. See Fischer, supra note 28, at 1654 (adoption of a market share theory will dramatically
increase liability exposure, and it may discourage development of new products); Comment, supra
note 1, at 321-23 (noting that increasing liability has prompted insurers to increase premiums
dramatically and they are reluctant to insure particularly risky industries; this in turn has resulted
in higher prices).
238. See Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420 ("Public policy
favors the development and marketing of beneficial new drugs, even though some risks, perhaps
serious ones, might accompany their introduction, because drugs can save lives and reduce pain
and suffering."); Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 574, 437 N.E.2d 171, 189-90
(1982) ("Imposition of such broad liability could have a deleterious effect on the development...
of new drugs, especially those marketed generically."); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241,
247 (Mo. 1984) (stating that there are legitimate concerns that market share liability "will dis-
courage desired pharmaceutical research and development while adding little incentive to produc-
tion of safe products"). See generally Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 597-98,
192 Cal. Rptr. 870, 878-79 (1983) (stating that there is a recognized public policy in encouraging
swift drug development); McKenna, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the Development of
a Vaccine Against the AIDS Virus, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 943 n.4 (1988) (noting that drug
companies would not immediately market an AIDS cure without extensive testing, fearing tort
liability otherwise).
239. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 618, 607 P.2d 924, 941, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (stating that imposition based on wealth of a defend-
ant is not a sound principle and creates a two-tiered system of justice), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
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the policy considerations regarding the ability of manufacturers to absorb
costs is insufficient to justify adoption of market share liability given the un-
clear effect on future drug availability.
Another policy consideration supporting the development of products liabil-
ity is that the production of safer goods will be promoted. 4 0 Proponents of
market share liability argue that adoption of the theory is also necessary to
provide incentive to produce safer generic drugs. 41 However, this argument is
unconvincing. First, the industry arguably needs no additional encouragement
above and beyond the incentives that strict liability and negligence laws pro-
vide to produce safer drugs.2 42 For years, the pharmaceutical industry has
been the frequent target of litigation, facing large damage awards. This expo-
sure has provided the industry with incentive to produce safe products. Before
any drug is introduced to the public, extensive research and development costs
are incurred to ensure that the product is safe.242 Furthermore, this country
has established and yearly funds the Food and Drug Administration which is
responsible for regulating the safety of pharmaceuticals.24" The FDA must
first approve the use of any new drug before it is allowed on the market. 4
After a drug is approved for sale, the FDA retains authority to remove the
drug from the market if a problem later is discovered.2 40
The likelihood of an incentive towards safety resulting from the imposition
of market share liability in DES cases also is questionable for another reason:
liability is not imposed until forty years after the undesirable behavior oc-
(1980); Kroll, supra note 8, at 195 (concluding that it is unsound to impose liability based on the
perceived wealth of defendant and its ability to obtain insurance); Comment, supra note 1, at 328
(stating that it is an unfair system to impose liability solely due to a defendant's ability to pay and
subsequently spread the costs).
240. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960) (product liability
enhances product safety); Robinson, supra note 7, at 741 (discussing cases where courts have
imposed liability as a safety incentive); Comment, The DES Manufacturer Identification Prob-
lem, supra note 7, at 867-70 (recognizing that courts impose strict liability on industries such as
the blasting cap industry as a safety incentive).
241. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (noting that drug
manufacturers are best able to discover and guard against product defects); Collins v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 192-93, 342 N.W.2d 37, 49-50 (reasoning that the cost of damage awards
will provide incentive to test drugs adequately), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
242. See Fischer, supra note 28, at 1657 (suggesting that market share may result in over
deterrence).
243. See generally Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 609, 607 P.2d 924, 935, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 143 ("the drug industry is closely regulated by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, which actively controls the testing and manufacture of drugs and the method by which they
are marketed, including the contents of warning labels"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); see
also 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (1985) (stating that the FDA is the public health promoter and
protector).
244. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988). Alternatively known as the Federal Food and Cosmetic
Act, the Act regulates the sale of food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices.
245. See id. § 355 (1988). Section 355 provides that "no person shall introduce or deliver into
interstate commerce any new drug unless an approval of an application ... is effective with
respect to such drug. Id. § 355(a).
246. See Note, supra note 234, at 775-77.
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curred and almost twenty years after the potential harm was discovered and
the product removed from the market.47 Most of the defendants in current
DES litigation had very little to do with the marketing of the drug when it
was taken as a miscarriage preventative.4 8 Imposition of liability at this late
date will have little deterrent effect. Today, drug manufacturers are guided in
their safety incentive by medical and scientific research and FDA regulations
not by this new concept for ensuring recovery. 24 19 A third reason why market
share liability does not provide a safety incentive stems from the fact that the
theory imparts potential liability on all manufacturers in the particular indus-
try. There cannot be an incentive to produce safer products if liability is still
imposed as a result of the negligence of others in the industry. The incentive
towards safety is also diminished if a manufacturer knows that others in the
industry will absorb the damages resulting from its negligence. 250
The safety incentive rationale is questionable for a final reason: the theory
has been adopted in only a limited number of jurisdictions, and thus far, mar-
ket share liability is'only being applied to manufacturers of DES. Therefore, if
a court adopts market share liability, the goal of warning manufacturers to
produce safer products will not reach a wide array of drug manufacturers or
other industries. The limited reach of the rule will produce little incentive for
most manufacturers to produce safer goods since only one segment of the
pharmaceutical industry is affected.
Similarly unavailing is the policy argument that adoption of market share
liability encourages manufacturers to maintain more detailed records that will
enable plaintiffs to identify the culpable party.2 1 Normally, when DES leaves
a manufacturer's plant, it is identifiable. Somewhere along the chain of distri-
bution, however, the drug becomes commingled and less traceable. 25 2 Due to
the fungible nature of DES, drug manufacturers have very little ability to
keep track of the ultimate market and user of the drug. Moreover, the drug
industry did not violate any laws regarding the maintenance of sales records.
With the adoption of market share liability, however, manufacturers neverthe-
less are punished for their failure to maintain better records.
Certainly, there are infirmities in the rationale offered to justify adoption of
247. See Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Mo. 1984) (noting that the theory
adds little incentive for production of safe products); Fine, supra note 210, at 901.
248. See generally Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 609-17, 689 P.2d 368,
385-89 (1984) (determining if a potential defendant that acquired a DES manufacturer might be
amenable to suit as a result of successor liability).
249. See Fine, supra note 210, at 901-02.
250. See Miller & Hancock, supra note 8, at 103-04 (explaining by way of example that farm-
ers affected by flooding have an incentive as a group to build a dam to prevent flooding, but an
incentive as an individual to minimize any contribution to its construction).
251. See Robinson, supra note 7, at 734-35 (noting that the improved record keeping justifica-
tion is scarcely dispositive in determining whether to shift the burden).
252. For instance, in Smith, part of the problem in identification may be attributed to the
health clinic because it labeled the drug as only "Tab 98," as well as to the laws regarding main-
tenance of records. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 III. 2d 222, 265, 560 N.E.2d 323, 343 (1990).
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market share liability. Moreover, to the extent that these reasons and policy
goals are met, they do not provide sufficient basis for judicial adoption of the
theory.
D. Pharmaceutical Drug Manufacturers Should Not Become Insurers of
Their Industry
Another justification offered for adoption of market share liability is that
the DES manufacturers breached a duty to make a safe product and, there-
fore, liability should be imposed. " First, one must note that in the cases
adopting the theory no breach of duty had yet been established because the
issue was decided on the basis of pretrial motions.2 4 Additionally, there is
conflicting evidence as to whether DES is in fact an unreasonably dangerous
product or whether it is especially harmful.2 5' Regardless, the concept that
liability may be imposed based merely on a breach of duty or creation of risk,
without causation established, has long been rejected in American tort law. 56
Courts should not easily discard historic tort law principles merely because
the defendants are members of the drug industry or because a plaintiff has
suffered an injury. Market share liability, however, does disregard tort law
principals. As a result, manufacturers are insurers of not only their own prod-
ucts but also the products of other manufacturers in the industry. 57 Addition-
ally, market share liability in DES cases causes solvent defendants to become
insurers of an industry that existed approximately twenty to forty years ago.
253. See id. at 265-66, 560 N.E.2d at 342-43. The plaintiff in Smith argued that the drug
manufacturers were liable for their breach of duty to a foreseeable plaintiff. Under plaintiff's
interpretation of duty, manufacturers of products for human consumption have a special responsi-
bility, and any manufacturer of DES can be held liable because it breached a duty owed to her.
Id. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating:
The plaintiff and appellate court have too, broadly interpreted the duty of a drug
company and to whom it owes that duty. Both negligence and strict liability require
proof that defendant breached a duty owed to a particular plaintiff. Each manufac-
turer owes a duty to plaintiffs who will use its drug or be injured by it. However, the
duty is not so broad as to extend to anyone who uses the type of drug manufactured
by a defendant, and the fact that a duty is owed does not abrogate the requirement
that the plaintiff maintains the responsibility of identifying the defendant who
breached the duty.
Id. at 265-66, 560 N.E.2d at 343.
254. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 28.
256. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 100-101 (1928)
(stating that negligence in the air is not a basis for imposing liability; plaintiff sues for a wrong
personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another); see also
Board of Educ. v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 111. 2d 428, 442-43, 546 N.E.2d 580, 591 (1989) (conclud-
ing that creation of risk is insufficient to impose liability); Note, supra note 8, at 1021 (adopting
market share liability may lead to assessing damages based only on wrongful conduct).
• 257. See Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986); Kroll, supra note 8, at
194-97; see also Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, Ill, 454 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1983)




As Justice Richardson stated in his Sindell dissent:
The majority's decision effectively makes the entire drug industry (or at
least its California members) an insurer of all injuries attributable to defec-
tive drugs of an uncertain or unprovable origin, including those injuries
manifesting themselves a generation later, and regardless of whether partic-
ular defendants had any part whatever in causing the claimed injury.25
Such a result is unwarranted. The majority of plausible DES defendants
have not been, or cannot be, brought before a court."' Those defendants who
are brought before courts bear the difficult burden of establishing their share
of a relevant market. The companies that cannot prove their share will have to
pay the unattributed portion of the damages, thus paying the damages that
rightfully belong to companies that are insolvent, not amenable to suit in the
jurisdiction, or for some other reason, are not before the court. The Sindell
court justified its ruling in part on the belief that over the run of the cases, a
company's liability would approximate the harm it caused.2 60 However, this
assumption is purely illusory, as recognized in Hymowitz. 261 This type of judi-
cial legislation is an unreasonable overreaction in an attempt to achieve what
is perceived as a socially desirable result. A decision to adopt market share
liability not only distorts a state's common law but also is best decided by the
legislature and not the courts.
VI. LEGISLATURES, NOT COURTS, SHOULD DETERMINE THE PUBLIC POLICY
IN DES CASES
There is a strong appeal in compensating DES daughters for their injuries.
However, in fashioning market share liability theories, the state supreme
courts are, in essence, legislating. In fact, the courts that have adopted market
share liability have expressly done so after determining what they perceive as
public policy demands in the DES cases . 2  The courts declining to adopt mar-
ket share liability recognized that the issue demands a judgment on public
policy; these courts then concluded that the legislatures could better address
258. Sindell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 621, 607 P.2d 924, 942-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
150-51, (Richardson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
259. See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 254, 560 N.E.2d 324, 338 (1990).
260. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
261. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 512, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d
941, 950, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 350 (1989).
262. Id. at 507-08, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947. The Hyrnowitz court acknowl-
edged that it was doing what it perceived public policy required. The court's determination of
what it believed the public demanded was influenced by the fact that the New York legislature
had amended its statutes of limitations to allow the plaintiffs to bring a cause of action in DES
cases. Id.; see also Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 199, 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (recog-
nizing that some innocent defendants will shoulder the burden of liability, the court stated that
that was a price "defendants, and perhaps ultimately society, must pay to provide the plaintiff an
adequate remedy under the law"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
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the issue. " The Sindell court, however, rejected the dissent's argument that
the issue should be left to the legislature because the majority found no "justi-
fication for shifting the financial burden for such damages from drug manu-
facturers to the taxpayers of California."2 64
The market share liability issue involves determinations of public policy.
The various state legislatures are the appropriate forums for determining pub-
lic policy in this instance.2 65 A legislature has the ability to hold hearings,
listen to debate, receive data on the extent of the problem, and ultimately to
determine what, if any, remedy the state should provide. In performing this
function, legislatures face divergent interests when considering the adoption of
market share liability. On the one hand, a state may strongly desire to ensure
that its citizens are compensated for injuries and have access to courts to pur-
sue their claims.266 On the other hand, a state legislature may recognize the
strong public interest that the pharmaceutical industry continue its research
and development of new and safe drugs. A legislature is equipped to determine
what economic effect the imposition of market share liability will have on the
industry. State lawmakers may determine that the laws should not sanction a
tort theory which likely will apply to only a small group of defend-
ants-pharmaceutical manufacturers-and which may have a disproportion-
ately large economic impact. Or lawmakers may determine that the theory
unreasonably expands the state's laws to benefit a narrow class of plaintiffs.
The legislature also may decide to fashion its own form of market share liabil-
ity, or it may decide to remunerate the victims without assigning fault to any
group of defendants.
Courts are not the proper forums for making these policy evaluations in
DES cases because they do so without any concept of the extent of harm or
even risk of injury involved by the maternal ingestion of the drug.267 Reliable
evidence indicates that although hundreds of thousands of women took DES,
263. See supra note Il1.
264. Sindell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 613 n.30, 607 P.2d 924, 938 n.30, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 149 n.30, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
265. See Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986); Goldman v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 33 Ohio St. 3d 40, 51, 514 N.E.2d 691, 701 (1987); Note, supra note 8, at
1028-42 (proposing state or federal legislation as a remedy).
266. Most state constitutions have a provision known as either the "open courts," or "access to
courts," or "right to remedy," which expresses the state's policy that its courts should be open to
allow redress for its citizens' injuries. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (Courts shall be available
to any person for all injuries.); FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21 ("The courts shall be open to every person
for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."); MD.
CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 19 (Everyman ought to have a remedy for any injury.); Mo.
CoN sT. Bill of Rights art. 1, § 15 (Courts of justice open for everyone and a remedy afforded for
every injury.); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18 ("All courts shall be open; every person for an injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy be due courts of law; and right
and justice shall be administered without favor, denial or delay."); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16 (All
courts open to any injured person to give a remedy without delay.); OR. CONST. art. I, § 10
(Courts shall administer justice to everyman without delay.).
267. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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the incidence of injury to their children is minimal.26 ' The courts are thus
emasculating existing tort law for the benefit of a narrow group of people
while the necessity of the action remains open to question. Such a determina-
tion could be addressed more intelligently and thoroughly in the legislative
forum, where both sides of the issue would be analyzed appropriately.
Certainly one may argue against deferring to the legislature in this instance
because the pharmaceutical industry and the insurance industry are influential
and will be able to politically sway the issue their way. On the other side of
this issue, however, are the powerful trial lawyers associations and other bar
groups, both of which are coordinated on the state and national levels and
which have also exhibited legislative persuasion. Moreover, in similar in-
stances, legislatures have in fact determined that persons suffering' injuries re-
sulting from drugs or other products should be compensated, thus thwarting
the desires of the insurance industry and drug manufacturers." 9 The compen-
sation such legislation provides is not awarded by courts. Instead, compensa-
tion comes from a specific fund established for the purpose.2 70
Legislation which compensates victims for injuries resulting from defective
products generally establishes a fund and a procedure people must follow in
order to receive money. The recovery fund is established from revenue received
by members of the industry producing the product or through tax revenue. A
structured and predictable system for recovery is thereby created that operates
at a lower monetary cost and in a more efficient and expeditious manner. In-
jured parties benefit by avoiding protracted and uncertain civil litigation. The
268. See supra note 28.
269. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-I to 300aa-14
(1988). The Act's goal is to do away with the typically protracted civil litigation against a child-
hood vaccine manufacturer, as well as the risk of being denied a recovery because of the failure to
prove the prima facie elements of a tort law action. The Act seeks to stabilize the fragile vaccine
industry, such as DPT, in order to ensure the availability of the drugs. Victims injured after 1988
must first prosecute a claim under the Act before pursuing a separate cause of action under tort
law. Id. § 300aa-I 1(4-5). Victims injured before 1988 have the option of filing a claim under the
Act. Id. § 300aa- 11. However, a victim must choose one option or the other; once the choice is
made the victim is precluded from pursuing the alternative avenue. See generally 38 L. FRUMMER
& M. FREEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 51.02 (1988) (analysis of the Act); Schwartz & Mah-
shigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for
the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 387, 389-93 (1987) (discussing the method of compensating
victims).
A person who suffered an injury must submit a petition to the United States Claims Court
alleging that the injury is vaccine-related. A presumption of vaccine-relatedness arises when the
injury suffered is listed in the Vaccine Injury Table, and the injury occurs within the time frame
set forth in the Table. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (1988) (listing the presumptive injuries and time
frames). A special master reviews each.claim and the evidence and prepares findings of fact and
conclusions of law on whether compensation is appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c) (1988). The
"Manufacturers Excise Tax on Childhood Vaccines" funds the Act. See Shackil v. Lederle Labo-
ratories, 16 N.J. 155, 183, 56 A.2d 511, 525 (1989).
270. See Note, supra note 8, at 1028-36 (outlining the numerous state and federal legislation
that establishes funds and procedures to compensate victims who may not be compensated under
existing tort law).
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legislation recovery system insures that there is a source from which to re-
cover. Also, the manufacturers' costs of defending suits and the necessity of
insuring against unknowable damage awards are eliminated. A legislated re-
covery system is predictable in the sense that manufacturers know in advance
what their costs of compensation will be. However, the public ultimately bears
the costs for this either in its tax bill, if it is funded through tax revenue, or in
the higher prices paid for the goods, if the manufacturers have to bear the cost
and decide to pass it on in the form of higher prices.
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts in the past have not been hesitant to develop new tort concepts.
Courts should, however, decline to adopt market share liability because of the
theory's infirmities. Market share liability is a flawed concept that likely will
apply only to a narrow class of plaintiffs and defendants. Moreover, rejection
of the market share liability concept will not leave DES daughters or other
plaintiffs without a remedy. Some DES plaintiffs have been able to establish
the identity of the specific manufacturer, while others will be able to establish
enough evidence to proceed to trial on the issues of causation in fact or negli-
gence. Adoption of the market share liability theory, though, contravenes ex-
isting tort principles. The theory deviates too greatly from a principle which
serves a vital function in the law: causation in fact. In the final analysis, the
legislature, and not the court, is the appropriate forum for determining
whether to adopt or reject market share liability.
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